October 7, 2001, brought an end to the Liberal Hegemonic Order (LHO) before it had even begun. The ‘rules-based’ Liberal Hegemonic Order (LHO), the ideological expression of a Pax Americana which underpinned the international order from the end of the Cold War allegedly saw the global expansion of human freedom and sustained economic growth (Ikenberry, 2011, 2018). Hegemony, as the Marxist political thinker Gramsci reminded us in his Prison Notebooks (Gramsci, 1992), rests on consent as well as coercion. The illusion rather than the exercise of power allows the hegemon to rule not through fear but acquiescence. October 7 shattered that myth. The US flexed its muscles in launching the ‘good’ War on Terror against what they deemed misogynistic, medieval Muslim fanatics who harboured the terrorist mastermind of the attacks of September 11, 2001: Osama bin-Laden. The invasion and subsequent occupation managed to garner the support of the “international community” of sovereign states against a transnational, invisible enemy: a particular, globalized form of Wahhabi Political Islam as represented by al-Qāeda. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) triggered article 5 – which states that an armed attack against one NATO member shall be considered an attack against all members – for the first time and only time in its history (North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 2025) and, at last, found a convincing raison d’etre after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
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The US-led invasion and occupation of Afghanistan was legitimized by the “international community” and, in particular, by the United Nations (UN), through the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1401 (UNAMA, 2026). Invasion proved relatively straightforward with the collapse of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Də Afghānistān Islāmī Imārat; IEA). Occupation proved to be more difficult. The reconstruction of Afghanistan, undertaken at considerable cost in terms of funds and lives, lasted twenty years and represented America’s ‘longest war.’ However, the initial stated objectives of Operation Enduring Freedom—the destruction of the leadership of al-Qāeda—had been met ten years before the eventual US withdrawal. President Barack Obama declared an end to Operation Enduring Freedom in 2014, yet US forces remained under Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, while NATO continued its presence through the Resolute Support Mission. The goals of the continued US occupation, legitimized by the wider international community, were rationalized with reference to key components of liberal peacebuilding: a commitment to statebuilding, liberal democracy, economic liberalization, human rights and security, and gender empowerment.
However, on August 15, 2021, the government of President Ashraf Ghanī fell to forces of the Islamic Movement of the Taliban (Də Ṭālibānō Islāmī Taḥrīk; hereafter the Taliban). Ghani, the democratically elected head of state, had earlier fled Afghanistan in the face of the US withdrawal. The Taliban returned to power, largely unopposed. Figures for casualties vary but have been estimated at 176,000-212,000 (Human Costs of War / Brown University, 2026), including 46,000 civilians (Hartung, 2024). It is estimated that the US alone spent almost $1 trillion on the war (Malkasian, 2026). In short, Afghanistan represented a defeat not only for the US but for liberal peacebuilding (Dodge, 2021; Mac Ginty, 2025)
This short article will first attempt to critically interrogate the role liberal peacebuilding played in the legitimization of imperialism which, it is argued, still shapes the theory and practice of international relations (IR) (Shani, 2024). It will, furthermore, suggest that a pluriversal approach to peacebuilding is better able to conceptualize political difference in a post-Western world. Liberalism is a secular ideology which emerged from within a particular cosmology, or rather constellation of cosmologies, which comprise the modern West. The West here is deployed not as a civilization with a set of core, doctrinal beliefs confined to a specific geo-cultural territory (Huntington, 1993, 1996) but as a hegemonic “self” defined with reference to an “other.” It draws upon sets of evolving, overlapping and frequently contradictory cosmologies, rooted in both Graeco-Roman and Judaeo-Christian traditions which, after the renaissance, reformation and Enlightenment, gave rise to a particular form of modernity: secular modernity. This conception of modernity, which has a material basis in capitalism, is indistinguishable from the historical process through which it has been “globalized:” coloniality (Quijano, 2007). The concept of cosmology refers to a set of normative epistemological and ontological claims about the origins of the cosmos and our place in it with implications for the way we understand the relationship between territory, culture and difference; the ‘religious’ and the ‘secular;’ and humans and the environment (Behr and Shani, 2021; Shani, 2026). It will take Afghanistan as an illustrative example since the language of liberalism was deployed to legitimize the invasion and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11.
In Afghanistan, this language came to incorporate far more than the initial military objectives of the post-2001 intervention. Released U.S. records indicate that the primary strategies prioritized defeating al-Qaeda and the Taliban while avoiding extensive post-Taliban military and reconstruction commitments. However, by April 2002, the Bush administration had articulated broader objectives, including a stable government, a new Afghan army, and an education system for boys and girls (Blanton et al., 2021). This broadening of objectives increasingly linked post-9/11 reconstruction to a more comprehensive project of political and social transformation based on the institutional and normative commitments of liberal peacebuilding (Goodhand and Sedra, 2010; Suhrke, 2011). In this regard, military power, development assistance, and institutional reconstruction became intertwined within a mission that offered specific forms of political and economic order as foundations of sustainable peace (Newman, Paris and Richmond, 2009; Paris, 2004; Richmond, 2006). Liberal peacebuilding therefore operated not simply as a set of technical measures for rebuilding institutions after conflict, but as a normative vocabulary through which imperialism could be articulated as reconstruction, reform, and political progress.
The US intervention sought to reorder political and social life in Afghanistan by challenging assumptions about legitimate authority, political institutions, social transformation, and the conditions of peace itself. Afghanistan is significant, then, because the political order supported through liberal peacebuilding ultimately proved unsustainable. It also demonstrates how particular understandings of peace and political order became part of the aims and the legitimation of imperial intervention. The US intervention combined overwhelming external military power with extensive influence over the reconstruction of Afghan political institutions, while presenting political reconstruction as a transition towards a legitimate and sustainable order (Manchanda, 2020; Suhrke, 2011). The imperial nature of this intervention, however, should not be understood as a straightforward reproduction of nineteenth-century colonial rule. The ‘great game’ of the nineteenth century played by the British and the Tsarist Russian Empires sought the expansion of geopolitical influence yet did not attempt to change the nature of Afghan society. British colonial policy in the mainly Pashtun North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) which bordered Afghanistan rule sought to rule through, rather than replace, ‘tribal’ structures.
The Soviet and US interventions of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, however, had a biopolitical dimension which stemmed from a cosmological commitment to secular modernity. The USSR intervened after the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) seized power in 1978 and carried out far-reaching social and political reforms through a centralized revolutionary state which generated resistance among differently positioned religious, regional, and rural actors whose relations with state authority were themselves diverse (Barfield, 2010; Rubin, 2002; Saikal, 2012). The Soviet military intervention in 1979 sought to save the socialist project and the subsequent external support provided to different resistance factions from the US embedded these conflicts within wider Cold War relations and gave rise to the conditions which led to the development of a militant, political Wahhabi Islam that was later espoused by both al-Qāeda and the Taliban. Rather than leaving Afghan society alone after the removal of the Taliban, the US sought to reconstruct it along liberal lines by strengthening state institutions, introducing electoral democracy, a market economy and a discourse of human rights through which to articulate claims against the state.
Despite obvious differences, the US’s ideological, or rather, cosmological commitment to liberalism was similar to the way in which the Soviets had attempted to restructure Afghan society—or rather Afghan societies given the ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity within Afghanistan—according to Marxist-Leninism. Seen in Gramscian terms, liberal peacebuilding formed part of the hegemonic framework through which coercive external power was accompanied by claims to legitimacy, yet these claims were primarily for a domestic rather than Afghan audience. Within the broader intervention, liberalism provided an institutional and normative vocabulary through which external involvement could be articulated as reconstruction, reform, development, rights, and security. Liberal peacebuilding thus helped render the intervention as politically meaningful and legitimate to a US audience and the wider ‘international community’ of states which emerged in the post-Cold War era.
A particularly revealing example of this hegemonic process can be found in the discourse of gender empowerment. The Bush administration foregrounded the Taliban’s brutal treatment of women and framed the struggle against the Taliban in terms of women’s rights, dignity, and liberation (United States Department of State, 2001; Okubo, 2024). Liberal peacebuilding consequently spoke on behalf of Afghan women by claiming to represent their rights and emancipation, but it also spoke through women insofar as their suffering became part of the moral and political vocabulary through which the Taliban was represented as an oppressive and illegitimate political order. This produced a powerful binary in which the Taliban was portrayed as oppressing women, while international intervention and liberal peacebuilding could be represented as supporting women’s liberation and political progress. Women’s rights discourse therefore contributed simultaneously to the de-legitimation of the Taliban and to the legitimization of the US intervention and occupation (Okubo, 2024). This does not deny the reality of Taliban oppression or the substantive gains made by Afghan women after 2001 (or indeed the substantial gains that had been made during the Soviet occupation). The point is instead to draw attention to how women’s diverse experiences of oppression by the Taliban could be homogenized and represented through a victim–liberator framework that silenced them (Spivak, 1999) and denied them agency in resisting Taliban oppression and also established particular understandings of oppression, emancipation, and legitimate political order as authoritative.
If cosmologies encompass different normative, epistemological, and ontological understandings of being, belonging, authority, obligation, political order, and peace, political difference cannot always be assumed to consist simply of diverse perspectives within an already shared political world (Behr and Shani, 2021). In this respect, political difference is not only about having different perspectives on the same political world. It can also involve different ways of understanding how authority, obligation, legitimacy, and peace are constituted and recognized in the first place. In this context, the concept of pluriversality provides a way of approaching such plurality. It begins from the possibility that political reality may be constituted through multiple, heterogeneous yet entangled worlds rather than through one world within which difference must ultimately be translated or resolved (Escobar, 2020; Querejazu, 2016; Trownsell, Behera and Shani, 2022). This does not mean that these diverse worlds are clearly separated, internally homogeneous, or mutually isolated. They may overlap, interact, and be transformed through these relations without necessarily coming to share the same understanding of political reality. In terms of peacebuilding, this means more than simply including additional actors, perspectives, or forms of local knowledge within an established framework. It also raises the question of whether the ways in which peace, legitimacy, authority, and political order are understood and recognized can themselves remain open to reconsideration and revision across political and cosmological difference. In this sense, pluriversal peacebuilding is not an alternative model of imperial intervention, but an analytical reorientation towards the terms through which peacebuilding understands and engages political difference. Pluriversality, in short, helps us to rethink peace (Hinton, Shani and Alberg, 2019).
Twenty-five years after October 7, the experience of Afghanistan invites a reconsideration beyond liberal peacebuilding itself to what this experience reveals about peacebuilding more broadly. In this respect, the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 matters not as a final assessment of the post-2001 project or as proof of the superiority of an alternative political order, but as a critical moment that brought unresolved tensions within it. The lesson from the post-2001 project requires us to go beyond the binary question of whether a particular liberal model was implemented successfully or not. More fundamentally, peacebuilding becomes part of asymmetrical relations of power when historically situated understandings of peace, legitimacy, authority, and political order are treated as universally valid and beyond contestation.
From this perspective, the case of Afghanistan reveals a tension within the liberal hegemonic project associated with the LHO. Particular values and forms of political order were presented as universal, and political transformation in peacebuilding was justified based on these norms. These norms were shaped within particular historical and cosmological contexts and acquired authority within them. A pluriversal rethinking does not mean removing this tension or replacing liberal peace with another model presented as universal. The assumptions and criteria that shape what is recognized as legitimate norms, political order, and peace also need to remain open to questioning and theoretical contestation. The post-2001 interventions in Afghanistan therefore provide a case through which peacebuilding can rethink the relationship between universal claims, hegemonic power, and the plurality of the worlds it seeks to understand.
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Prof. Giorgio Shani is Chair of Politics and International Studies at International Christian University (ICU), Japan. He is author of Religion, Identity and Human Security and Sikh Nationalism and Identity in a Global Age; co-author of Sikh Nationalism; and co-editor of Rethinking Peace and Religion and Nationalism in Asia. His most recent publication is From civilizations to cosmologies? Rethinking IR in a pluriversal world (Pluriversal International Relations, Vol. 1-2, 2026). Follow him on X @GiorgioShani.
Dr. Tokoyo Okubo was awarded her PhD in Peace and Conflict Studies at the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, International Christian University (ICU), Tokyo in 2025. Her doctoral dissertation, titled An Investigation into the “Failure” of Liberal Peacebuilding Strategies in Post-9/11 Afghanistan, critically examined the extent to which the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 can be understood as a “failure” of liberal peacebuilding.


