Iran’s Foreign Policy: From the Balance of Power to the Pivot to the East
Arman Mahmoudian
Since the late eighteenth century, Iranian foreign policy has gone through a series of evolutions, revolutions, and transformations. These changes were often dictated by historical circumstances, geopolitics, geography, and, perhaps most importantly, the pressure Iran faced from other powers. During the Qajar era, from 1789 to 1925, the Iranian government found itself surrounded by major powers. Along its western border, Iran faced the Ottoman Empire. To the north, it confronted the Tsarist Russian Empire, while to the southeast it faced Britain and British India.
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Iran faced growing pressure as Russia expanded southward into the Caucasus and Central Asia. Following a series of wars, Russia forced Iran to relinquish its claims to extensive territories in the South Caucasus, including areas that today form much of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, as well as territories connected to present-day Georgia. These losses were formalized through the treaties of Gulistan in 1813 and Turkmenchay in 1828. In response to these pressures, Iran adopted several different foreign-policy approaches in its effort to preserve its sovereignty and independence.
Balancing Strategies: The Balance-of-Power and Third-Power Approaches
Iran initially adopted a “Balance-of-Power” approach. Iranian leaders sought British assistance in pushing back against Russian expansion. Britain viewed Iran mainly through the lens of protecting India and was unwilling to enter a major confrontation with Russia solely to defend Iranian interests. The problem, however, was that Iran did not possess sufficient strategic importance for Britain to risk war with Russia on its behalf. As a result, the support Iran hoped to receive never materialized, and the balance-of-power strategy failed to counter Russian pressure.
Following this failure, Iran turned to a new foreign-policy approach: the “third power” policy. One of the earliest examples of the third-power policy was Iran’s brief partnership with Napoleonic France. The Qajar government hoped that France would provide military support against Russia and help Iran recover its lost territories. In this context, the two countries signed the Treaty of Finckenstein in May1807, formalizing the Franco-Persian alliance as a counterbalancing force primarily against Russia and Britain.
However, this partnership did not last. When Napoleon reached an accommodation with Russia at Tilsit in July1807, France effectively abandoned Iran. Following the failure of the third-power policy, Iran returned to the balance-of-power approach and turned toward Britain, hoping that British assistance would help contain Russian expansion. This effort, however, produced the same result, as Britain remained unwilling to confront Russia on Iran’s behalf.
As Russia continued to expand from the north, Britain increasingly sought to limit Iran’s influence in the east, particularly in Afghanistan. British officials regarded Afghanistan, and Herat in particular, as a vital defensive buffer for British India. They therefore opposed Iranian attempts to bring Herat under their control, fearing that Iranian expansion might enable Russia to extend its influence closer to India.
These tensions eventually contributed to the Anglo-Persian War of 1856–1857. After Iranian forces captured Herat, Britain declared war and launched attacks against Iranian positions in the Persian Gulf. Under the Treaty of Paris of 1857, Iran was forced to withdraw from Herat and formally abandon its claims to the city.
In response to the growing British threat, Iran turned to its former enemy, Russia, seeking to build a partnership that could serve as a counterbalance to Britain. This effort, however, produced few benefits and came at a considerable cost. Russia did little to help Iran restore its control over Herat, while exploiting Iran’s dependence to extract extensive concessions.
One such concession came with the Treaty of Akhal in 1881. As Russia continued its expansion into Central Asia, it compelled Iran to accept a new frontier with the Russian Empire and relinquish its remaining claims to territories north of the border, particularly in areas located in what is now, Turkmenistan.
The Ottoman Empire also periodically competed with Iran over borderlands, tribal loyalties, religious influence, and the allegiance of Kurdish communities living along the frontier. Therefore, throughout much of the Qajar period, Iran faced pressure from several directions while lacking the military and economic capabilities required to resist these powers effectively.
To make the matters worse, by this stage, both Russia and Britain had established significant political and economic influence inside Iran. They sought commercial privileges, loans, monopolies, and concessions from the Qajar government. Iranian efforts to maneuver between Russia and Britain also created suspicion in both capitals. Rather than forming equal partnerships with Iran, Russia and Britain sought to extract concessions, expand their political and economic influence, and establish a stronger presence inside the country.
This process culminated in the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Under the convention, Britain and Russia divided Iran into three spheres of influence: a Russian sphere in the north, a British sphere in the southeast, and a nominally neutral zone between them. Iran remained formally independent, but the agreement seriously undermined its sovereignty and was concluded without meaningful Iranian participation.
As Iran faced simultaneous pressure from Russia and Britain, Iranian leaders experimented with alternative foreign-policy approaches. One of these was return to the “Third-Power” policy. The term “third power” did not refer to a minor or weak country. Rather, it meant an outside power other than Russia or Britain that could help Iran reduce its dependence on both. By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Germany had become a major European power, while the United States was emerging as an increasingly influential power. Unlike Russia and Britain, however, neither had the same history of territorial expansion or direct imperial competition inside Iran.
Under this approach, Iran sought relations with Germany, the United States, and other European powers that could counterbalance Russian and British influence. However, Iran’s fundamental problem remained unchanged. Iran did not possess sufficient geopolitical or strategic importance for any third power to be willing to risk conflict or escalation with other major powers, such as Russia or Britain, on its behalf.
The Positive- and Negative-Balance Approaches
Having failed to secure meaningful support from a third power or to counterbalance the growing pressure from Russia and Britain, Iranian politicians became divided between two major schools of foreign-policy thought: “Positive Balance” and “Negative Balance.” These two approaches remained central to debates over Iran’s foreign-policy strategy for years.
Positive Balance generally involved granting concessions or opportunities to competing powers in an effort to maintain an equilibrium between them. The assumption was that Iran could prevent one foreign power from becoming dominant by offering comparable benefits to its rival.
Some Iranian political figures instead favored closer alignment with one particular power. Vosough od-Dowleh, for example, selected Britain as Iran’s prospective partner and concluded the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919. The agreement would have given Britain extensive influence over the reorganization of Iran’s military, administration, finances, transportation system, and infrastructure. Although Iran would have remained formally independent, opponents argued that the agreement would have effectively turned the country into a British protectorate or semi-dependent state.
The agreement was signed in August 1919, but it never received the required approval of the Majlis (Iranian parliament). Once its terms became widely known, it generated intense opposition. Iranian nationalists objected to the secretive nature of the negotiations, the extent of British influence envisioned by the agreement, and allegations that Iranian officials had received payments in connection with it. As a result, the agreement was never implemented.
Other Iranian political figures advocated a policy of negative balance. This approach was associated with figures such as Hassan Modarres and later, most prominently, Mohammad Mossadegh. Supporters of negative balance argued that Iran should refuse to grant major concessions to any foreign power. Rather than granting a concession to Russia to offset a British concession, or vice versa, Iran should reject comparable demands from both. Mossadegh later made negative balance a central part of his political outlook, particularly in connection with the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry.
The difficulty with negative balance was not necessarily the principle itself, but Iran’s weakness. This weakness was military, economic, and institutional. The Qajar state lacked the revenue and administrative capacity to maintain a modern army, while the central government often struggled to control provincial officials and tribal forces. Russia pursued territorial expansion, while Britain was less interested in annexing the remaining Iranian territories than in preventing Iran from regaining Herat. British officials feared that Russia could exploit its influence over a weak Iran, gain access to Herat, the gateway to Afghanistan, and threaten British India. Without sufficient domestic capabilities, Iran often struggled to enforce its independence even when its leaders refused foreign demands.
Following the 1921 coup, Reza Khan gradually became the dominant political figure in Iran. He first served as minister of war and later as prime minister before becoming shah in December 1925 and ruled Iran until 1941.
The Return of Third Power Approach
Reza Shah strongly pursued the third-power policy. Rather than relying exclusively on Britain or the Soviet Union, he sought to expand Iran’s relations with powers such as Germany and the United States. His objective was to reduce Iran’s dependence on its two traditional rivals and to obtain foreign expertise without allowing Britain or the Soviet Union to dominate the country.
Germany became particularly important to this strategy. German companies, engineers, technicians, and industrial experts played an important role in Iran’s modernization projects. Germany was also attractive because it did not have the same history of territorial expansion and political interference in Iran as Britain and Russia.
However, Reza Shah’s growing relationship with Germany created serious problems during the Second World War. Britain and the Soviet Union became increasingly concerned about the presence of German nationals and possible German influence inside Iran. Reza Shah declared neutrality, but he resisted Allied demands to expel German citizens.
In August 1941, Britain and the Soviet Union invaded Iran. The presence of Germans provided part of the political justification for the invasion, but it was not the only reason. The Allies, Britan and the Soviet Union, also wanted to secure Iran’s oil resources, protect transportation routes, and establish the Persian Corridor as a supply route to the Soviet Union.
The invasion forced Reza Shah to abdicate in favor of his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Therefore, Reza Shah’s close relationship with Germany contributed to his fall, but the invasion should also be understood within the broader strategic context of the Second World War.
The Positive Nationalism Approach
After Mohammad Reza Pahvali came to power, Iran gradually adopted a new foreign-policy approach that he described as “positive nationalism.” The young shah initially had limited authority, particularly during the Allied occupation of Iran. However, over time, and especially after the 1953 coup, Iran became increasingly aligned with the United States.
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi argued that Iran should remain an independent and sovereign country and conduct its foreign policy according to its national interests. At the same time, he believed that, among the major powers, the United States was Iran’s most natural and reliable partner. He maintained that the United States, unlike Britain and Russia, had no territorial ambitions toward Iran and occasionally presented Iran and the United States as countries that shared certain cultural and political values, including individualism and opposition to communism. This was the shah’s own interpretation, even though Iran itself remained an authoritarian monarchy.
Throughout much of his rule, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi maintained a close relationship with Washington. Iran became an important American ally in the Middle East and one of the largest purchasers of American military equipment. The shah used this relationship to modernize Iran’s armed forces, strengthen the Iranian state, and expand Iran’s regional influence.
However, the shah’s closeness to the United States also became one of the factors that turned parts of the Iranian population against him. His opponents increasingly portrayed him as dependent on Washington and argued that the United States exercised excessive influence over Iran’s domestic and foreign policies.
This criticism was particularly important among religious opposition groups and supporters of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Nevertheless, the shah’s relationship with the United States was only one cause of the growing opposition that contributed to the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
The Neither East nor West Approach
With the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty, Iranian-American relations deteriorated dramatically. One of the clearest examples was the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, by militant Iranian students. Ayatollah Khomeini subsequently endorsed the seizure, and the hostage crisis became a defining moment in the breakdown of relations between the two countries.
However, Khomeini’s foreign-policy doctrine of “Neither East nor West” did not begin with the hostage crisis. It had already been one of the principal slogans of the revolutionary movement and became a foundational principle of the Islamic Republic. Khomeini believed that Iran neither needed nor should seek dependence on either of the two principal global powers, the Soviet Union or the United States. He regarded both as imperialistic, expansionist, and oppressive powers, although the Islamic Republic’s hostility toward the United States was generally much greater.
Under the doctrine of “Neither East nor West,” Iran claimed that it would preserve its independence from both Cold War blocs. Instead of relying on the major powers, Khomeini argued that Iran should build relations with Muslim countries, revolutionary movements, and what he described as oppressed nations.
In theory, the doctrine rejected dependence on both Washington and Moscow. In practice, however, Iranian foreign policy remained shaped by the country’s security needs, regional circumstances, and changing relationships with the major powers. Nevertheless, “Neither East nor West” became one of the central principles through which the Islamic Republic presented its foreign policy after 1979.
However, like other Iranian foreign-policy approaches, the “Neither East nor West” doctrine changed in response to shifting international circumstances and Iran’s domestic political environment. In 1989, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a strong opponent of Iranian dependence on either the Soviet Union or the United States, passed away. His successor, Ali Khamenei, who was serving as president at the time, was selected as Iran’s new Supreme Leader.
Approximately two and a half years later, the Soviet Union—the “Red Empire”—collapsed. This event significantly transformed Iran’s geopolitical environment. The emergence of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan created a belt of newly independent states between Iran and Russia. For the first time in modern history, the two countries no longer shared a direct land border.
This territorial separation reduced Russia’s image as an immediate threat. For nearly two centuries, Russia had expanded southward, seized Iranian territories, and pressured the Iranian government. After 1991, although Iran and Russia continued to compete in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Caspian Sea, Russia no longer posed the same direct territorial threat.
The transformation of Russia itself was also important. Unlike the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation was not a revolutionary communist regime. Both Khomeini and Khamenei rejected communism as an atheistic and materialistic ideology incompatible with Islam. Khomeini was particularly hostile toward the Soviet system, while Khamenei maintained the same ideological opposition but increasingly distinguished post-Soviet Russia from its communist predecessor. Soviet support for communist organizations such as the Tudeh Party, as well as its support for Iraq during much of the Iran-Iraq War, had contributed to Iranian distrust. The collapse of communism removed an important ideological source of tension between Tehran and Moscow.
Russia’s foreign policy was also changing. Some Russian leaders advocated integration with the West, while others argued that Russia should remain an independent great power. A third approach became associated with Yevgeny Primakov, who promoted a multipolar international order and closer relations with China, India, Iran, and other influential regional states.
Iranian leaders welcomed this approach. They viewed multipolarity as an alternative to the American-dominated international system that emerged after the Cold War. From Tehran’s perspective, post-Soviet Russia was not seeking global domination in the same way as the former Soviet Union, but instead was attempting to limit American influence by cooperating with other powers.
Nevertheless, Iran did not immediately abandon “Neither East nor West.” Under Presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, Iran expanded relations with Russia and China while also seeking economic cooperation and improved relations with Europe. Later, under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, as Iran’s nuclear dispute with the United States and Europe intensified, Tehran accelerated the expansion of its relations with Eastern powers, including Russia, marking the full emergence of the “Pivot to the East” approach.
The Pivot to the East Approach
Iranian leaders argued that “Neither East nor West” prohibited dependence on foreign powers, not cooperation with them. They also distinguished between the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. Russia no longer shared a border with Iran, promoted communist revolution, or possessed the same capacity for global expansion. Closer relations with Moscow were therefore presented as consistent with Iranian independence.
Under the Pivot to the East, China became Iran’s most important economic partner, purchasing Iranian oil and exporting manufactured goods to the country. India also played an economic role, although its relationship with Iran became increasingly limited by its growing ties with the United States.
Russia, by contrast, primarily emerged as Iran’s military, nuclear, and strategic partner. Iran needed to rebuild its armed forces after the Iran-Iraq War, while Russia became the Soviet Union’s principal successor state and retained much of its military institutions, skilled personnel, design bureaus, and weapons-production capacity. Although the Soviet breakup left some important facilities in other former republics, the core of the arms industry remained in Russia, which increasingly needed foreign customers. Iran consequently purchased Russian aircraft, tanks, submarines, helicopters, missiles, and air-defense systems. Russia also completed the Bushehr nuclear power plant.
However, the relationship was not a formal alliance and remained affected by mutual distrust. Russia sometimes delayed weapons transfers or limited cooperation under Western pressure. The partnership was therefore based less on trust than on shared interests, particularly an opposition to American influence. This cooperation became most visible in Syria. Iran supported Bashar al-Assad from the beginning of the Syrian civil war, while Russia directly intervened in September 2015. Russian aircraft provided air support to the Syrian forces, Iranian personnel, Hezbollah, and other Iran-backed groups operating on the ground. This marked the first sustained Iranian-Russian military campaign in a third country.
The Pivot to the East became even more important after the United States withdrew from the nuclear agreement in 2018 and reimposed sanctions. It was further strengthened under President Ebrahim Raisi, whose government prioritized relations with neighboring countries and non-Western powers. In July 2023, Iran became a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Relations with Russia were further institutionalized through the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, signed in January 2025. The treaty expanded cooperation in security, defense, energy, transportation, trade, and technology, although it did not create a formal military alliance or a mutual-defense commitment. By 2025, the Pivot to the East had become one of the principal directions of Iranian foreign policy. It had produced extensive economic relations with China, military and nuclear cooperation with Russia, joint operations in Syria, and Iran’s growing participation in non-Western institutions.
However, the Pivot to the East did not formally replace “Neither East nor West.” Instead, Iranian leaders reinterpreted the older doctrine. They maintained that Iran could preserve its independence while using closer relations with Russia and China to counterbalance American pressure. Whether this represented genuine independence or a growing reliance on Eastern powers, remained an important question.
If the primary objective of Iran’s Pivot to the East was to counterbalance the West and reduce pressure imposed mainly by the United States, the policy failed to deter the Israeli attack of June 13th, 2025, the subsequent U.S. strikes of June 22nd, and the joint U.S.-Israeli war launched on Iran in February 28th, 2026. The renewed exchanges of fire in the Persian Gulf and the reinstatement of the American naval blockade in July 2026 have raised an important question: should the Pivot to the East be considered a failure?
The fact that neither Russia nor China intervened militarily has strengthened this criticism. Both condemned the 2026 attacks and called for diplomacy, but neither attempted to alter the military balance in Iran’s favor.
The Future Direction of Iran’s Foreign Policy
Iran now has three broad options. The first is greater isolation and avoidance of major alignments. This is unlikely to work. Iran’s military infrastructure has suffered considerable damage, while the country needs weapons, air-defense systems, investment, and access to international markets to recover from the war, sanctions, and the blockade.
The second option is a major pivot toward the West. Iran could attempt to de-escalate tensions, reach agreements with Washington and European governments, and reduce its dependence on Russia and China. Although this might appear pragmatic, it would be politically difficult. A close relationship with the United States would challenge one of the central ideological foundations of the Islamic Republic and could be portrayed domestically as surrender after a destructive war.
This option is even less likely under Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. His father, Ali Khamenei, and his wife were killed in the opening attack of the 2026 war, alongside several members of the wider family. This creates both a personal grievance and a political constraint. Even if he favored de-escalation, an opening toward Washington after a U.S.-Israeli war that killed his father would carry significant costs among his political base.
The third and most likely option is the continuation of the Pivot to the East. Its failure to deter an American attack does not necessarily mean that Iran will abandon it. The Pivot to the East was a foreign-policy orientation, not a formal alliance. Iran had no mutual-defense treaty with either Russia or China and may therefore have expected more from these relationships than Moscow or Beijing had promised.
Iranian leaders also understand that Russia and China have interests extending beyond Iran. China depends heavily on international trade and maintains one of its most important economic relationships with the United States, despite the decline in bilateral trade during 2025. Russia, meanwhile, remains focused on Ukraine and its broader confrontation with the West.
Iran is therefore unlikely to abandon the Pivot to the East. In fact, continuing hostility with the United States may encourage Tehran to deepen it. Iran still needs foreign investment, weapons, technology, and diplomatic support, while its confrontation with Washington remains unresolved. The more important question is whether Russia and China will reciprocate, or whether Iran will discover that its eastern partners value the relationship only when the political and military costs remain limited.
Arman Mahmoudian is a research fellow and lecturer in international affairs at the University of South Florida. He is the author of the forthcoming book The Lion, the Bear, and the Eagle: Iran, Russia, and the United States and Their Struggle over the Modern Middle East. His analysis has appeared in Foreign Policy, The National Interest, CNN, BBC World News, Le Monde, and other outlets. You can follow him on X at @MahmoudianArman.