The U.S. and Iran have had antagonistic relations ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. This constant state of hostility, of course, is understandable since the U.S. and Iran have differed throughout this entire period over several issues. These include Israel and the Palestinians, the Iranian nuclear program, the political orientation of Syria and Iraq, Iranian support for the “Axis of Resistance” (Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iraqi Shi’a militias, and others) which have targeted U.S. forces and allies in the region, and now control over the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. Indeed, there is little that Washington and Tehran have agreed upon since 1979. Common opposition to the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 as well as common opposition to the rise of Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria in the mid-2010s were interests which both shared, but these were not strong enough to enable them to overcome their many differences.
Get E-International Relations delivered to your inbox, free. As you sign up, consider becoming a paid subscriber, or make a donation, to support our work.
There is one sense, though, in which continued U.S.-Iranian hostility ever since 1979 is not understandable. In his masterful 1996 book Revolution and War, Stephen M. Walt theorized about how revolution in one country can quickly lead to war between it and one or more status quo powers. As Walt observed, this is because each side sees the other as an existential threat but also sees the other as weak in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, thus creating a strong incentive for one or both to attack the other while it is seen to be weak and before it can pose a stronger threat in the future.
Walt also theorized, though, about how after status quo powers find themselves unable to reverse the revolution they see as a threat and after the revolutionary regime discovers that exporting revolution is more problematic than it had originally hoped, the two sides come to realize that they cannot defeat each other. Normal relations between them start to develop when the status quo powers accept the existence of the revolutionary regime while the revolutionary regime halts efforts to export revolution. They can then coexist.
Walt himself expected Iranian-American ties to improve in his 1996 book where he wrote that “...efforts to establish more normal foreign relations have already begun and are likely to increase” (p. 268). Needless to say, this did not occur either then or at any time since then. I don not want, however, to single Walt out for being wrong about this. At various points, I also thought that an improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations was possible. Indeed, many scholars have observed that revolutionary regimes tend to moderate over time for any of several reasons, including the frequent pattern of extremists being displaced by moderates, socialization, embourgeoisement, emergence of a common adversary, or other reasons still.
Whatever the reason that other revolutionary regimes have grown more moderate and their relations with status quo powers have become normalized, however, this clearly has not happened in the case of Iran, which has had antagonistic relations (involving greater and lesser degrees of intensity) from 1979 to the present with America, the West in general, conservative Arab states, and, of course, Israel.
What would it take, then, for this to change and for normalization to occur between the revolutionary regime in Iran on the one hand and America, the West, and conservative Arab states (if not Israel) on the other? Extrapolating from Walt’s 1996 theory, this only seems likely to occur when Iran halts all efforts to export revolution through its support for the Axis of Resistance, and the U.S. and its allies halt all efforts to undermine the Islamic Republic. An agreement resolving the Iranian nuclear issue by itself would not suffice. Just as Soviet and allied military intervention in support of Third World Marxist regimes during the 1970s interrupted the considerable progress that Washington and Moscow had made regarding strategic arms control, continued Iranian support for the Axis of Resistance will undermine the achievement or the durability of another Iranian nuclear accord.
But in that status quo powers have never yet been able to coerce or persuade Tehran into halting support for Iran’s Axis of Resistance allies, it seems highly doubtful that they will be able to do so in the future—especially now when the Iranian leadership seems to think that it is winning the ongoing conflict between Iran and the Axis of Resistance on the one hand and the U.S., Israel, and the Gulf Arab states on the other.
For Tehran to end its support for the Axis of Resistance, a major change would need to happen inside Iran. Its leaders would have to come to the conclusion that Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi Shi’as are not assets, but liabilities. A cost benefit analysis would also have to be made in Tehran which finds that better relations with America, the West, conservative Arab states, and perhaps even Israel better serves the Iranian leadership’s interests than the activities of the Axis of Resistance.
Indeed, continued support for the Axis of Resistance would have to be judged as a waste of Iranian resources that could be better spent on more important matters, especially internal economic development—something that would be greatly enhanced by the trade and investment that would come with having good relations with as many countries as possible (and not mainly with China and Russia). A truly Machiavellian Iranian leadership that prioritized the acquisition of nuclear weapons might even calculate that its ability to do so would increase if it ditched the Axis of Resistance, improved ties with its long-time adversaries, and thus made the prospect of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons seem no different than India or Pakistan having done so.
Nor is the Trump administration, much less Netanyahu or any other Israeli leader, likely to see the possibility of improved relations with Iran occurring any time soon. Indeed, the better Iran and its Axis of Resistance do in the ongoing conflict, the more U.S. and Israeli leaders are likely to see it as necessary to do something to thwart Iran. Instead of conforming to the pattern that Walt and others identified of relations between a revolutionary regime and status quo powers normalizing over time, then, the U.S.-Iran case may be one in which they only get worse.
Despite his premature optimism about the possibility that relations between Iran and status quo powers would improve, Walt also foresaw the possibility that they may not. In his 1996 book, he observed that relations between revolutionary states and other countries would become normal, “assuming, of course, that each side is capable of evaluating and revising its policies in light of experience.” (p. 43) It is this capability that has been lacking. Further theorization about why this is the case and how it can be altered is definitely in order.
Mark N. Katz is Professor Emeritus of Government and Politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government, and Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. His writings on revolution include Revolutions and Revolutionary Waves (1997), Reflections on Revolutions (1999), and ed., Revolution: International Dimensions (2001).
