Opinion – The Human Cost of Migration Deterrence in Egypt
Elena Habersky
A Sudanese woman sits quietly during a creative workshop on migration trajectories held at a local refugee-led organization in Cairo. The convener has asked the participants if they can see themselves in a story she just told of Harriet Jacobs (1813 – 1897), a former slave and abolitionist in the United States who encountered many barriers during her long journey to freedom. The woman raises her hand and quietly expresses that, yes, she sees herself reflected in the story. She begins to tell the convener and her fellow participants that she was on a truck speeding through the expansive desert somewhere between the Sudanese-Egyptian border in the summer of 2023. As the truck hit something on the route her young son flew up into the air and she was unable to grab him to pull him back. He fell out of the truck and laid amongst the vast and inhospitable landscape. Her voice starts to crack and tears well in her eyes. For those of us who know these stories intimately, we know that was the last time the woman laid eyes on her son. Smugglers do not stop for anything or anyone in the desert; their only goal is making sure their transport arrives at the agreed upon destination. Only a little over three years ago, this woman and her son could have entered Egypt without the need for any visas. This is no longer the case, and as Egypt continually tightens its border controls many individuals are intimately experiencing the impact of such policy decisions. While many associate migration deterrence policies with global North states; particularly Australia, the European Union, and the United States, many countries in the global South are also practicing such deterrence for their own reasons.
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Time and time again, people have argued that migration deterrence does not work, and I argue that countries in the global South are no different by exploring the case study of Egypt. Closing borders and attempting to filter people, especially those fleeing conflict, only forces those same individuals to either take more expensive and dangerous routes or be stuck in the enveloping violence. If someone is able to cross the border, deterrence does not end as the threats of residency checks, detention, and deportation loom. By looking at the stories of displaced Sudanese in Egypt, one can see how such policies have a true human impact.
Migration deterrence uses the theoretical idea of push-pull factors when it comes to the reasons why someone may migrate. For example, some pull factors may be the promise of employment, social welfare, political rights, safety, and education. Push factors may include economic issues, war, conflict, and oppression of varying forms. As many migration scholars have argued over the years, push-pull factors are outdated and focus more on economic factors for movement with little focus on the importance of social norms and networks. However, from a government’s perspective, in order to stop this so-imagined push-pull cycle, at least from one side, a government needs to take away or decrease the factors that may entice a migrant to leave their country and enter one that is not their own. One such way is implementing restrictive border controls and constricting internal measures.
According to political scientists Marlene H. Jacobsen and Rhys Machold, what makes migration deterrence policies notable is the “ways longstanding logics of deterrence are refashioned in the contemporary world to ‘solve’ supposedly new problems, in this case the problem of unwanted migration.” One only needs to look at political rhetoric from the border wall between the United States and Mexico, the rejected Rwanda Plan in the United Kingdom, or Austria tightening its border controls with fellow Schengen countries Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia to see that there is no lack of government support for such deterrence policies.
Yet, support for such deterrence is not just an idea within the so-called global North, though most examples come from there. Countries from the global South also utilize deterrence policies, as well. Sometimes, countries act as a first-instance deterrence so migrants cannot make further onward journeys to the global North, thanks in no part to externalization policies and the benefits that come with them. Externalization is often used by wealthier countries who, in order to prevent asylum seekers and migrants from reaching their physical borders, enlist third countries and/or private groups, sometimes criminal, to stop such migration trajectories before these groups can reach their destination. Countries also experiencing economic and political issues may use deterrence policies to try and stem such problems, all the while using migrants as scapegoats. At the end of the day, countries from all over the globe often espouse their right to sovereignty when making such decisions. There are many criticisms of deterrence policies, including by politicians, activists, and academics. Rightly, researchers have argued that deterrence policies have two major costs. One is monetary; countries spend a lot of money trying to stop migrants by utilizing offshore detention, state of the art technology to achieve pushbacks, and the payment of trained border guards. The other is simply, deterrence does not work at stopping migration, but rather redirects migrants to take much more expensive and dangerous journeys, calling into question whose human rights ultimately matter.
There are many reasons why countries in the global South may practice migration deterrence. As mentioned, the espousal of state sovereignty is one. When Egypt enforced visa regulations on all Sudanese in June 2023, government spokespeople talked about the safety of the country and the appearance of ‘fraudulent visas’ for profit which needed to be stopped. One can also look at outside pressure, especially from the European Union, which earmarked 100 million EUR in June 2023 for border management, search and rescue, and anti-smuggling efforts, as well as support to ‘absorb the new waves of Sudanese refugees’. This overall support increased in 2024 with an EU-Egypt partnership totaling 7.4 billion EUR, including a package of shared EU-Egypt priorities on migration worth 200 million EUR until 2027. Finally, bilateral relations also play a role as Egyptian President Abdelfatah El-Sisi has stated in diplomatic meetings with the Sudanese Prime Minister that the country supports Sudan’s “unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity”. Needless to say, there is no clear-cut reasoning for why a state practices such policies and, with the answers being complex and ever-changing.
To add but another country to the ever-increasing findings that deterrence does not work: Egypt. For displaced Sudanese in Egypt deterrence is not just a reality at the border but one within the urban spaces they now occupy. For decades, Sudanese did not need visas to enter their northern neighbor, a reciprocal agreement between the two countries. The ‘Four Freedoms Agreement’, which allowed for freedom of residency, employment, property ownership, movement and was beneficial for both countries, “in fulfilment of the wish of the two brotherly peoples of Egypt and Sudan and their aspirations for unity, progress and the formulation of a new way of life on the land of the valley of the Nile”. These rights slowly eroded in 2017 as Sudanese men aged 18-49 were required to possess entry visas to Egypt due to Sudan’s decision to restrict imports of Egyptian farming products. Egypt responded by deciding to raise residency fees for Sudanese living in Egypt. Sudan then required Egyptians seeking to enter its territory to obtain entry visas, which was then immediately reciprocated by Egypt.
In June 2023, this policy was expanded to include all Sudanese nationals, a mere two months after the outbreak of the disastrous Sudanese conflict, often termed the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. On April 15, 2023, a simmering conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) exploded in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum, with heavy gunfire, explosions, and the targeting of the airport, state TV, and the presidential palace forcing many to take immediate shelter and shops to remain closed. Clashes erupted in other cities throughout the country with the violence from the two warring factions slowly spreading and leaving many to become displaced. As tensions between the two neighbors continued to rise.
While the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affair’s spokesperson, Ahmed Abu-Zeid, speaking on this visa restrictions at the time “clarified that the decision aims to provide regulations rather than restrictions on Sudanese individuals ”, the policy has greatly impacted the safety and migration trajectories of Sudanese fleeing the violence which immediately emerged from the conflict. After the policy was put into effect many Sudanese found themselves stranded within the country, unable to obtain a visa from the Egyptian consulate in Port Sudan. Even with coveted connections, getting a visa to enter Egypt is incredibly difficult, leaving many with no choice but to travel clandestinely. These smuggling routes are treacherous and come with their own dangers: lack of food and water, heatwaves in the desert leading to dehydration, high speeds of the trucks, with stories of trucks flipping over killing everyone, as well as people falling out and left to die, no sanitation, and the threats of gender and sexual based violence, especially towards women.
As I have previously written, Sudanese also use these smuggling routes as forms of transnational migration, going back and forth between the countries for a plethora of reasons: work, study, and life events like engagements, weddings, and funerals. While some tell stories of taking selfies in the desert and getting to know the smugglers a little better over the years, this does not mean that the safety of such a dangerous journey has become better or that the trip has become less expensive. However, smuggling is a lifeline for many Sudanese. Indeed, the story of Sudanese transnational migration paints a complex picture of ongoing migration dynamics between Sudan and Egypt amidst the backdrop of the ongoing conflict.
The complications plaguing Sudanese do not stop if and once they arrive. Internal barriers are making their lives, along with other migrant communities, increasingly difficult. Valid residency is now needed to access any public services, like education and healthcare, though bureaucratic backlogs mean that renewal wait times can be two years or longer. There has also been an escalation of documentation checks, detentions, and deportations, even of those with valid residency and documentation from the United High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), defying the international legal principle of non-refoulment. Unfortunately, in 2026 alone there have been six public cases of Sudanese individuals dying in detention. Many Sudanese are now scared to leave their apartments and those that do know the risks involved.
Nevertheless, even with all the deterrence policies attempting to stem and stop migration, many Sudanese are weary of returning back just yet due to the volatile nature of the conflict. Those that have returned home face new struggles for survival and some even decide to leave once more back to Egypt. Egypt should allow them to enter, to apply for asylum or legal residency, and should respect their rights to international protection.
Despite the challenges of Egypt’s deterrence policies, particularly smuggling and the challenges faced by Sudanese after arrival in Egypt, the adaptability of the Sudanese people persists. The smuggling routes, although perilous, have become a lifeline, allowing Sudanese to navigate outward, and sometimes back and forth for family, business, and cultural ties, as they have done for centuries. Migration is not a straightforward journey; rather, it is one characterized by flexibility and fluidity. As a migration scholar, I implore that politicians, policy makers, and lay individuals not oversimplify narratives with clear-cut policies of what is a fluid reality for many. In this situation, we need to recognize the ongoing struggles and complexities of Sudanese migration to and from Egypt, one in which Sudanese are doing what they have always done by traveling between the two countries and attempting to live their lives in relative safety in exile, once again proving that migration deterrence policies do not work, even if they are practiced within the global South.
Elena Habersky is a Migration Scholar and PhD candidate at the University of Glasgow. She currently serves as an affiliate for the Refugee Law Initiative (RLI) at the University of London, a PhD Representative for the IMISCOE Standing Committee on Forced Migration and Refugees, and as a co-editor for the Externalizing Asylum Blog. Elena is on the Advisory Committee of Locally Led, a grassroots organization which supports refugee-led organizations (RLOs) in the global South and continues to work as a consultant for a Sudanese RLO in Greater Cairo.
Editorial Credit: Min Young Park