In December 2010, when South Africa was formally incorporated into BRICS, the country’s foreign ministry said it was in line with its commitment to South-South cooperation, noting also the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) prediction that BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) will constitute 61 percent of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) within three years (that is by 2013). For South Africa, it viewed BRICS as another vehicle promoting the interests of the Global South alongside other structures such as the African Union (AU), United Nations (UN), the India Brazil South Africa Dialogue Forum, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and the G-77 which constitutes the largest grouping of developing countries seeking to promote their collective economic interests. Through its BRICS membership, South Africa also hoped to amplify and support the African Agenda, and the continent’s presence in multilateral institutions (South African Government 2011).
The South African government was undoubtedly right to stress the importance of BRICS. By July 2025, BRICS expansions resulted in it having 11 member countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Indonesia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In addition, BRICS also has 10 partner countries which are Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. These countries collectively make up 44 percent of global GDP when measured by purchasing power parity, and 56 percent of global population (Norton 2025).
South African Foreign Policy: Caught in an Ideological Trap
The ruling African National Congress (ANC), which has been in power since South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994, has a particular view of the world emanating from being banned within the country and in exile for 30 years – between 1960 and 1990. These three decades shaped much of the worldview of the ANC. Whilst much of the West criticized the ANC’s decision to opt for an armed struggle against white minority rule with leaders like US President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher labeling them ‘terrorists’, they did receive some support from Nordic countries which provided the ANC with financial resources. These financial resources, however, were not to be used for the prosecution of the armed struggle. The strongest support the ANC received was from the Soviet Union, East Germany, Cuba, Algeria, Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya, and to a more limited extent, China and Iran (Ellis 2012).
The ANC’s transition from an exiled liberation movement to a government did not fundamentally alter the worldview which it developed whilst in exile. It saw the world in black and white terms, with the Global North helping to underdevelop and exploit the Global South. Whilst the West could not be trusted, South-South solidarity needed to be strengthened with an emphasis on those countries that supported the ANC whilst in exile (Mandela 1993). Pretoria’s White Paper setting out its foreign policy and entitled Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu represents this ideological perspective as opposed to any conception of national interest (South African Government 2011).
The White Paper notes, “In terms of South Africa’s liberation history, its evolving engagement is based on two central tenets, namely: Pan-Africanism and South-South solidarity” (South African Government 2011, 3). On the issue of Pan-Africanism, suffice to say that the other African BRICS members – Egypt and Ethiopia do not subscribe to it, given their attempts at undermining South Africa. The White Paper further goes on to argue that its view of South-South cooperation is that of the 1955 Bandung Conference which brought into being the Non-Aligned Movement. The document is clearly problematic since it attempts to develop a foreign policy which does not consider current realities, future geo-strategic projections or the needs of South Africa’s citizens, but is entirely focused on the ANC’s own past struggle against apartheid.
Talk of a Global South solidarity suggests that all countries in the South are on the same page seeking to emancipate themselves from the hegemonic control of the Global North. This, however, is patently untrue. China has the distinction of having the world’s second-largest GDP in nominal terms (Silver 2026). India meanwhile is the third-largest economy globally from a purchasing power parity perspective (Solomon 2025, 35-37). These Asian countries may well describe themselves as being in the Global South and may well continue with the narrative of the exploitation of the Global North. However, China and India see themselves as superpowers that could well dethrone the US from its top position. Whilst ostensibly being in the Global South, China and Chad or India and Ivory Coast have little in common. Apart from points on a compass, there is little that North and South represent in the world of international relations. Some states in the Global South rival those in the Global North whilst exploiting others in the Global South. The material power of some in the Global South dwarfs others in the Global South and all states operate along national interest principles.
In both Western countries and what was traditionally referred to as the Third World, opulence and poverty co-exist. These BRICS countries have huge socio-economic divides within their own borders. An important measurement to assess inequality is the Gini Coefficient Index. A score of 0 implies full equality, whilst 1 suggests massive inequality. South Africa with 0.67 has the highest inequality in the world. Brazil with 0.5 is not far behind. There is also rising inequality in China, Russia, and India (Galan 2026). How is it possible then that countries which cannot bridge the huge socio-economic divides within their own borders can fix those between the so-called North and South?
The establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB) by BRICS was touted as a new investment vehicle for the Global South that would lend money to developing states. That way, it would be more emancipatory than the traditional Bretton Woods institutions. However, since its establishment, its approach has been rather orthodox, with similar lending criteria as the IMF and the World Bank. Consider here the decision by the NDB, headquartered in Shanghai, to suspend all transactions with Russia in March 2022 because of the risk posed by the war in Ukraine. There is also an argument that the NDB serves to consolidate Chinese control of the NDB. One example of this control was seen in July 2016 when the NDB issued its first green bonds in Chinese renminbi. Charles Simkins (2015) opines that the NDB is merely an extension of Chinese soft power where countries like Brazil and South Africa with a low savings rate borrow money from China with a high savings rate. If the Bretton Woods institutions are centred around the US and the broader West, then Beijing is Washington within the NDB and broader BRICS formation. None of this critical thinking, however, seems to have featured amongst South African policy makers. Their thinking is much too black and white, and the dichotomy between Global South and Global North was much too stark. Their vision of the world was a poor fit for the realities described above. Hence, a more nuanced picture is needed on the part of South Africa’s leadership.
There are also strategic differences between BRICS member states which undermine the cohesion of the bloc itself. Consider here the ongoing tensions between the two new African BRICS member states over the water of the Nile River which has periodically threatened to escalate into a war following the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile. The Blue Nile provides 85% of Egypt’s water needs and also provides hydro-electric power for Egypt. The GERD means less water downstream, decreased ability to electrify Egypt, and dire consequences for food security (Solomon and Tausch 2021, 237). Despite these escalating tensions, BRICS has not attempted to mediate in the conflict.
A similar situation has occurred around the war in the Middle East following the Israeli and US attack on Iran, and Iran’s response which included attacking other Gulf States, including fellow BRICS member, the UAE. Since 28 February 2026, BRICS has not issued a single statement on the Iran war (Hussain 2026). India currently chairs BRICS, and in New Delhi, matters came to a head in May 2026 when the BRICS foreign ministers met. The Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, demanded that BRICS members condemn Israel-US aggression, saying it violates the UN Charter, and wanted fellow BRICS members to take concrete action against what he termed “warmongering” behaviour. The UAE’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Khalifa bin Shahen Al Marar, meanwhile, called on BRICS member states to condemn Iran’s actions in the region. This prompted Araghchi to once more take to the floor, accusing the UAE of direct involvement in the aggression against Iran, and stating that fighter jets from the UAE were participating in aerial assault on Iran. Suffice to say that this meeting of BRICS foreign ministers concluded with no position taken on the war in Iran. The final document from the meeting ended with a rather meek statement that there was no common position on the Iran war given members’ “differing views”.
This unsatisfactory conclusion of the BRICS foreign ministers meeting prompted Jauhar Saleem, a former Pakistani diplomat to opine that, “BRICS is an organization with some very important countries, but it remains a disparate group with very different foreign interests, perspectives and agendas,” (Hussain 2026). Once more, Pretoria’s own position is unclear. Its Minister of Mineral and Petroleum Resources, Gwede Mantashe, has said that the government plans to send an official delegation to the Strait of Hormuz to ascertain the situation on the ground (Ensor 2026). For many commentators, this was a way for South Africa to postpone making any decision.
How South Africa should approach BRICS
Pretoria should focus on three issues as it seeks to engage with fellow BRICS member states. The first of these is to engage from a position of strength. This is not the case at present. Governance in the country is falling apart largely as a consequence of “cadre deployment” – the practice of hiring politically connected individuals who are appointed on the basis of their proximity to whichever faction of the ANC is in ascendance at that moment. In other words, people are appointed on the basis of who they know as opposed to what they know. Consequently, the state struggles to provide quality education, keep the lights on, provide security, or fix a pothole. Whilst South Africa struggles to do the basics, other BRICS member states are surging ahead in investment, entrepreneurship and innovation. Under these conditions, Pretoria will always be subservient to other BRICS member states, playing the role of Cinderella. For the country to earn its place at the BRICS table, it will need to ensure security and stability within its borders, stop treating its business sector as a pariah and work closely with it, fix its infrastructure, ensure that the best and brightest find their way into government, and ensure its education system meets the needs of the world of work for tomorrow. Respect and being treated as an equal internationally will only occur through domestic strength and resilience.
Second, South African foreign policy is ideologically dogmatic. This constitutes a poor fit for the fast-changing world we inhabit. South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa is correct to point out that there are major tectonic shifts in the world which is rapidly seeing the end of Pax Americana and the begrudging acceptance of a new multipolar order in the world (The Presidency 2025). This will necessitate a more pragmatic position on the part of Pretoria where not all of its efforts should be placed in the BRICS basket. Other BRICS countries have been far more adept at engaging in a more pragmatic foreign policy, and so should Pretoria. Consider here the fact that whilst India is part of BRICS together with China, it is also an integral member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, also known as The Quad. Consisting of Australia, India, Japan, and the US, it seeks to contain Beijing’s growing power projections in the Pacific (The Guardian 2022). The point being made here is simply this. Pretoria’s ideological blinkers prevent it from playing a more nuanced and sophisticated role within BRICS, and the international community generally.
Third, whilst aware of the dangers of the Make America Great Again (MAGA) of the Trump Administration, with its unilateral tariffs, its erratic foreign policy, and its protectionist policies that are causing much harm to those in the developing world, Pretoria should also be cautious in its embrace of China that is increasingly acting not as another Global South player, but as a global hegemon. Currently, China’s GDP constitutes almost 70 percent of the GDP of other BRICS countries combined. This economic dominance allows Beijing to direct the BRICS agenda, recruit new members for BRICS (in line with its Belt and Road Initiative), and embark on initiatives like the NDB. Whilst the NDB seeks to reduce reliance on Western-dominated financial institutions, it does create more dependency on China (Sarpong and Sibiri 2024).
China’s expanding military footprint on the African continent should also raise concern within the Union Buildings. It constitutes a clear and present danger to South African interests in its own neighbourhood. In fact, growing alongside its commercial interests is the militarization of its engagements in Africa. In 2017, China opened its first military base in Djibouti, located in the strategic Horn of Africa. This has taken on added strategic significance given the Iran war and the closure of the Straits of Hormuz by Tehran. The Chinese facility in Djibouti was originally billed as a “resupply facility”, then a “logistics facility”, and now hosts two brigades of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). What is particularly concerning is the fact that Beijing has built, financed, and/or operates 100 African ports through state-owned companies (Vines, Rij, and Tugendhat 2024). It is feared that China could make use of the debt owed to it by African states to convert some of these into naval bases. It is known that Beijing is actively seeking other military bases on the continent (Vines et al. 2024). Some of the countries that China is currently targeting for military bases are Angola, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, and Tanzania (Nantulya 2026).
China, of course, is not the only BRICS member engaged in this sort of activity. Spurred on by old and new energy sources as well as new technologies which require access to rare earths and the like, there is a new scramble for Africa. India attempted to open a military base in Seychelles but failed to secure this, and Russia sought to open a naval facility in Sudan. This attempt was also met with failure. Moscow is now attempting to establish a military base in the Central African Republic (CAR) (Vines et al. 2024). Russia has however established a number of airbases in Libya. These include Matan al-Sarra, al-Khadim, al-Jufra, Brak al-Shati, al-Wigh, Tamanhint, and al-Qardabiya. These air bases’ primary purpose has been to supply the thousands of Russian troops (first the private military company – Wagner Group, and now the Kremlin-controlled Africa Corps) across Burkina Faso, CAR, Mali, and Niger (McGregor 2025).
The militarization of the African continent by these fellow BRICS members belies the rhetoric of a different, more humane, more collaborative, more emancipatory world order which BRICS is supposed to stand for. It is the old order wrapped in new garments. National interests and realpolitik calculations continue to dominate. Moreover, it constitutes a clear and present danger to South Africa’s own national interests. Instead of approaching this issue with a shocking naivety, Pretoria would do well to learn the lesson put forth by Lord Palmerston in 19th century England. He was quoted as saying:
Therefore I say that it is a narrow policy to suppose that this country or that is to be marked out as the eternal ally or the perpetual enemy of England. We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow (Goodreads 2026).
Whilst Pretoria should continue its relationship with Beijing, Moscow, and New Delhi, South Africa cannot allow its national interests to be compromised by fellow BRICS members. It should balance this relationship by forging strong relations with Brussels and Washington as well as individual European Union (EU) states. Moreover, it is imperative that Pretoria seriously beef up its own defence budget with an emphasis on garnering new technologies so it can defend South African interests on the African continent. In addition, Pretoria needs to lobby fellow AU members to desist from allowing their territory to be turned into military bases by foreign powers. In the final instance, Pretoria needs to remove its ideological blinkers and adopt a more realist foreign policy.
References
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Solomon, Hussein. 2025. “The Shifting Debates about Climate Change and what it tells us about Global Power Relations.” In Future Research and Expectations in Science, Knowledge and Aspirations, edited by Dragana Popović. Independent University Banja Luka. DOI: 10.7251/ZNUBL2501035S
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South Africa Government. 2011. Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu. White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy, 13 May. https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/final-draft-white-paper-sa-foreign-policy.pdf
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Dr Hussein Solomon is Senior Professor at the Centre for Gender and Africa Studies, University of the Free State, South Africa.
Editorial Credit: Adeleke Olumide Ogunnoiki