In a recent interview, American hobby poet Victor Fet shared his thoughts on Russkaya kultura. When asked about his beliefs, he stated, “I suspect that the world of Russian, Soviet, Russian culture has long been dead, they have all gone down in history somewhere at the level of Babylon.” Appealing to legendary 19th-20th century figures like Alexander Chekhov, Vladimir Vysotsky, Alexander Galich, and Osip Mandelstam, his Russkaya kultura rejects post-20th century developments, instead seeing cultural unity’s decline abreast digital integration tantamount to cultural death. Overlooking its generationalism, he reveals a key issue with today’s post-2022 discourse on Russian culture. No one seems that clear on what Russkaya kultura constitutively is, and, most importantly, what it is not.
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As the lauded firebrand argued, “We cannot construct a history of Russian culture without Dostoevsky, Pushkin, and Tolstoy, but we can certainly do without [Boleslsav] Markevich, [Nikolai] Leikin, [Mikhail] Artsybashev, and [Ignaty] Potapenko” (Likhachev 1991). However, whilst the former deserve global immortalization, the latter are deemed unworthy of such an attribution. In this article, I examine this question through three topics. Firstly, I want to know what the Russian cultural identity referred to as Russki, actually is? Next, I explore the idiosyncratic example of female Russian rap, and the unique stressors placed upon women in Russian rap culture. To conclude, I coalesce these points with ideas of Russian civilizationalism, and its discursive relationship to Russkaya kultura.
An Open Question
While the Russian national identity, defined as Rossiiskii, continues its evolution amidst the chaos of Putin’s sundowning (Yusupov 2025, Akaliyski and Reeskens 2024, Iliș 2026), I want to instead refocus attention to a key question which, as a PhD researcher of 1990s Russian rap, is especially poignant. This question reconfigures the ways we think about Russia as Russia. It’s no secret the country suffers from an identity crisis. Having arisen as miscellaneous tribal groups. The Russes soon became a Chieftain-led people only to succumb to European monarchism which later devolved into Sovietism. Following modernization, Russia returned to monarchy. That is neo-Royalism (Goddard and Newman 2025), or if you prefer, neo-Tsardom (Cannady and Kubicek 2014).
I wish to air the deceptively simple question, what is contained in Russia’s cultural identity. Or, what is Russki?
Answering this question is remarkably complicated. Now, more than ever, clarity is necessary, as amidst the widening of mercurial revanchism, dire threats like revisionist cultural historiography (Arribas et al. 2020, Düben 2023) and unrelenting censorship, or what has been dubbed the “securitization of identity” (Kukulin 2021), fact must not turn antiquated. While from the start, Putin combined the terms, his 1999 Millenium Speech framing “the traditional values of Russians” in four elements: patriotism, statism, “belief in the greatness of Russia,” and social solidarity. Is this the Russki identity? I’m not convinced it is, and yet, deference to power has been seen as one of the defining characteristics of the Russian social contract from Rurik to the present. The so-called Russian Idea and the Russian Question is mired by those who assimilate Russia’s split notions of identity under the banner of the national, “russkii, conventionally interpreted as covering everything linguistically and culturally Russian, and rossiiskii, conventionally understood as referring to the Russian state and citizenship” (Laurelle et al. 2023). Gunking up the works for the rest of us, determining rap’s contemporary salience, much less women’s role in rap in Russia after 2018, requires accurately assessing these terms far more completely than ever before.
As part of the newly-published notion of Russia’s civilizational “Idea-Dream,” one gets a remarkably clear view of how Russians view the terms, albeit colored by post-invasion politics. According to the report co-sponsored by the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, the same Russian think-tank who runs the, Valdai Discussion Club, they characterize the Russki-Rossiiskii relationship as such, “the Code of the Rosians (’rossiyane’, people of Russia), of the Rusians (’russkiye’, people of the Russian civilization, including but not limited to the Russian ethnicity).” Rephrased, the people of the geographical space called Russia of the culturally-Russian peoples. But the question has not been answered, what is that “common culture” they say will “harmoniously build the Fatherland”? Is, or more accurately can, rap part of the equation? Or, asked a different way, can rap be part of the Russki mir? What would need to transpire , in form and content, to bring rap into the fold(s) of Pax Russica?
A central question which motivates me as a researcher of pre-2000s Russian rap is, “What makes Russian rap Russian?, but English obscures the real question, “What makes Russki rap, Russki, or culturally Russian?” If speaking Russian by itself is insufficient to consider oneself part of Russki mir (Tishkov 2008), then what does? Research on Russian cultural identity is laden with troubling logic and largely unhelpful conclusions. In a particularly incendiary take, being Russian in Putin’s Russia is, “masculine, Orthodox Christian, strong, and aggressive...accepting the nation’s historical status as a messianic savior of the world” (Garner 2023). Left terminologically undefined, what’s left unsaid is that Russian here is being used in the national, that is Rossiiski, context. However, what’s later discussed has effectively become the dominant way of thinking about the terms’ relationality. From Putin’s pre-invasion perspective, “subtle cultural therapy” is the gameplan to preserve and strengthen, “the Russian [Russki] cultural dominant, which is carried not only by ethnic Russians [Russkie] but by all bearers of this identity, regardless of nationality.” I’m less interested with national/political implications and more with how the Russian “cultural code” is left undefined. What is in and out of this code? Are contemporary cultures like Hip Hop included? Is popular music like rap part of the equation? Short answer, yes (Biasioli 2026).
In 1994, Alexander Solzhenitsyn framed the Russki vopros, the Russian question, as, “be to our people or not to be?” Walking through Russian cultural history from the 15th century to his post-Soviet present, he makes the argument that patriotism, not nationalism, fuels the Russki worldview, and its exemplification is through what he dubs, narodnikh, yet another polysemous term thrown around in discussions on the Russian identity. He further clarifies that Russian cultural identity is fueled by Russian morality built on Orthodox Christianity and community action. But he leaves the practical ontology of the concept he invokes only preliminary definitions. The Russian “Idea-Dream,” defined as, “a multiethnic people who have preserved our identity, are united by shared moral norms, and are bound together by the Russian language [Russki], Rusian [Rossiiskii] culture, and Rusians as the main state-forming people.” But this definition relies on Russki culture being defined by mostly the 19th and 20th centuries, leaving the question of whether more contemporary forms of culture like rap could be included.
By this definition, one of Russia’s most important music cultures, rock, is not part of Russian culture, nor is jazz or any one of the conventionally popular-oriented music genres, bringing me to this section’s conclusion. Within the rhetorical gestures of Russian cultural identity discourse, there seems to be identifiable gradations, although I refrain from calling them high and low. Instead, we could theoretically argue rap and its Western-born popular music ilk are, on Russian soul, considered second-generation Russki insofar as they became Russian through domestic acculturation. My question, “What is Russian in Russian rap?”, seems to thus suggest it is a byproduct of rap’s integration into Russian culture. Even then, it’s unclear what this really means (Krasnoshchekov 2022).
The Female Question
If the Russian cultural identity is open—a floating signifier or fuzzy concept, then anything active in Russia could be used for the expansionist project of Russki mir if seen to be viable. How do you distill the Russki from the mir if Russki has no fixity, and can be(come) reconfigured as contexts demand? This is evident in the way female rap in Russia has become part of the fight against Western decadence. Instasamka’s 2023-24 censorship, and her 2025 change from victim to perpetrator, is particularly demoralizing but not unexpected amidst these times.
Firstly, the integration of the 19th-20th century female question, or zhenski vopros (What is women’s role in Russian society) and Russian cultural identity discourse is hardly new (Ryabov 1996). What is new is the way it has become revived in pop cultural forms with more liberal gender relations and feminine/masculine expressive tactics, one example being rap. Secondly, the totalizing state cooptation of gender roles (Gradskova et al. 2026) has breathed new life into one of Russia’s most enduring paradoxes, namely the desire for a culture which rivals Western counterparts but is sustained by traditional values. Thirdly, and most vitally, subcultures like rap operate in a dialectical-dialogical dynamic with its mainstream counter as we know thanks to those like Dick Hebdige, J. P. Williams, Ken Gelder, among others. But what happens when subcultures are absorbed by larger powers via forced means, and previously exercised independence is slowly, but steadily, replaced by control?
From the little information we have (Rygina 2007, Diveeva 2020, Vandevert 2025), it’s clear when women produce rap in Russia, their expressions are both idiosyncratic, and shaped by the institutions around them. Even the term, subculture, is slightly strange as it’s specifically female Russian rap, or zhenski rap, which deserves the title given its lack of institutional support, commercial representation, market appeal, and public listenership. The question to ask is whether zhenski rap could be considered part of the Russki fold regardless of its minority status? This naturally ignores the glaring question of whether rap can be considered part of Russian culture, what Putin calls Russia’s supposed “cultural code”? We know that when state authorities get involved in women’s issues, there’s often ulterior, generally politically-motivated, agendas at play (Gradskova 2015). Moreover, the fixity of 19th-century thinking vis-a-vis gender roles (Kochergina 2017) is present amidst a semiotic shift towards a more self-confident type of femininity in Russian culture (Zaporotsheva 2023). Thus, women are caught in the medial crossfire between nostalgia and modernism (Gorchakova and Kokoshina 2025) in a new, ever more complicated, way. But what about the women who participate in rap culture in Russia? As Instasamka and Hoffmanita show, at one point, female sexuality was allowed to be not only shown but praised.
It’s best to see the three aforementioned points as one phenomenon—the contemporization of zhenski vopros through zhenski rap. To grapple with this, however, requires a foregrounding of the dominant paradigm in Russia today, conservatism. The attachment to traditional values is, akin to other analogues like anti-LGBT legislature, attempts at social control (Gradskova 2020). Moreover, Russian Conservatism is diverse except for one notion, “a reconciliation of its national Russian identity” through realizing “its greatness based on its historical traditions: the ideas of having a special path, an identity, sovereignty, and a specialness peculiar to Russian civilization” (Vertlieb and Faleris 2022). Part of this is Putin’s infamous child protection rhetoric (Brock 2022). Under the surface, endangerment of children and exposure to harmful material is paired with defense of ideological purity, with women becoming intermediaries between child, family, and state. Russian Conservatism thus ensures unity, however manufactured (Robinson 2019), in order to sustain the “Rossiiskaya tsivilizatsia” (Shuvalov 2011). But persecution of sex-positive female Russian rappers exposes an inherent ontological issue.
Abreast the revitalization of the “double burden,” or both sexes should financially contribute but men should raise money and women should take care of the family (Ukhova 2023), women in Russian rap culture carry a triple burden, namely mediating domestic ideations of masculinity and femininity. Russian ideas of these notions are complex and logically flawed, often relying as much on fallacious reasoning as cultural solipsism to survive any, and all, external scrutiny by arguing for ideological superiority. The post-2000 assimilation of masculinity with violence, aggression, and militaristic tendencies is both a byproduct of the Putin personality cult and of historical events, unresolved trauma, and colonial legacies. In other words, “Russia’s powerful imperial ambitions and identity, masculinised culture and politics, and a long-term inferiority complex vis-a-vis the West is an explosive mixture” (Yusupova 2022). Caught in the crossfire is femininity and “beauty labour” (Porteous 2018). Russian women’s femininity cannot be too individualistic as to alienate her from traditional norms, yet she must also defend her individuality but not so far as become masculine. Neither should men’s masculinity falter, lest he shame his country as a phenomenal embodiment of the, ironically androgenous, Russia (Scheller-Boltz 2017).
Interviews conducted earlier this year reveal the issue’s complexity. A representative from Osnova Pashasse stated, “there’s nothing feminine in our lyrics...Yes, our rap has a female voice, but it’s never had a feminine message.” They stressed women “constantly emphasize their gender in their lyrics and sometimes try to compete with men.” Ira PSP emphasized cultural invisibility, “we are neither heard nor seen. The girls and I have dedicated our lives to culture, but there is no return...pop projects are becoming popular, and the girls are writing the lyrics for the guys. That’s why there is no female rap in Russia!” But Kima discerned the problem, “Male rappers force their ‘non-rapping’ women into rap just for fun. And they’re happy to just clown around on stage. Because of people like that, rap is losing its relevance. I haven’t heard decent female rap lately that has both substance and a decent flow.” From the 1990s to the mid 2010s, female Russian rap was respected by the culture but something happened. To answer section the previously aired questions, I will explore my third and final point.
Zooming Out
I see the contemporary censorship of female Russian rappers and the ambiguous notion of what is, and is not, part of the Russki culture aspects of something I’ve already insinuated, namely the developing notion of Russian civilizationalism, and the antiquarianism of the idea of Russian national identity abreast expansion of the Russki mir. Civilizationalism has become Putin’s tool useful in exploiting Russki for supra-national unity, and in the process effectively side-stepping the citizen/emigre division. His Russki-first strategy is powered “not only by “Russianness” (Russkost’) but also by a language inspired by civilizational thinking” (Blakkisrud 2020). That term, Russkost’, is key towards linking civilizationalism with the “securitization of identity,” the ambiguity of the Russian cultural identity, and the dissolution of rap culture’s autonomy in Russia prior to the mid-2010s. As Paul Robinson’s book, Russia’s World Order, notes, Russian Civilizationalism is best seen as a counterreaction to the USSR’s demise, and the continuation of Russia’s struggle to dialectically find itself in relation to the West.
The way Russia has chosen to do this has almost entirely stemmed from its embrace of Romantic Nationalism, or Herderianism. But as Robinson clarifies, contemporary (or post-2022 invasion) Russian Civilizationalism is mostly fueled by geopolitical antagonism for what it sees as Western rapacity and unchecked solipsism against it and non-Western powers. The term, “flowering complexities,” originating with Konstantin Leontyev, meant to invoke the world’s non-reducible cultural heterogeneity. Interestingly, he also interpreted music as aesthetic externalization of non-lingual sense and sentiments of the human experience (Zinchenko 1999). Putin’s use of Leontyev’s term is used to negate what he sees as the West’s apathic flattening of the world’s cultural diversity.
Whether or not it’s a valid argument is less important here than the more central polemic, namely the use, and abuse, of the term, Russian culture, and its Russian iterations (Russkii, Russkie). As Robinson writes, the term is domestically connected to the ideologically-driven, pseudo-discipline of culturology—an essentialized mixture of cultural studies, ethnology, and anthropology. Its central thought is that, “the world is divided into distinct cultures, that Russian culture is different from that of the West, and that the introduction of Western values and institutions into Russia can only have negative results” (Robinson 2025). Foreign influence is seen as polluting the sanctity of Russian culture and invading the “Slav-Orthodox” space, whilst the entire discipline itself is but a clunky attempt at identifying, and legitimizing, the “Russian idea” (Laurelle 2004). But what are we talking about in more plain terms? That’s the thing, as much as it changes, it stays the same. The dominance of rap culture in Russia from the late 1990s onwards didn’t fundamentally change the discursive power of Civilizationalism but what did was the centralizing absorption of rap into the Civilizational machine. How did this occur you may ask?
To answer this, let’s look at russkost’, and what this term linguistically means. Firstly, Russki and Russkost’ imply related concepts but are separable. Whilst the former implies Russia’s ethnocultural identity, the latter centers around a feeling (-ost’) of Russian but its clarity ends there. Linguistically, the latter conveys an exhaustive array of meanings but center around the qualia of objects, actions, phenomena, and experiences as Russki (Popova 2009). What this means, from a Wittgensteinian sense, is that Russkost’ is part of the endless language game. The term is therefore an inherently meaningless ordering of phonemes into two morphemes creating what is effectively a chronolectical, cultural utterance which gains significance through its place in the semiosphere of contemporary Russia a la Lotman. Simplified, Russkost’ is yet another empty signifier where the meaning is a terminological hauntologism, taking semiotic shape of meaning but really only being thus because of an invisible shared contract. When one says Russki, or Russian culture, it’s as nebulous as Russkost’. While aspects can be connected to them, I argue they are but historical excesses forever clashing with modern life.
In a recent pedagogically-oriented study, Civilizationalism is defined as founded on five tenets: an interplay of constancy and reproductability, historical uniqueness (or what Robinson dubs historical determinism), whatever “civilizational” (or “traditional”) values means, self-sufficiency, and political irreducibility. This view sees culture as the facilitators of supraethnic communality under the banner of civilizational sustainment, with history of Russia becoming, “history of a single civilizational community, encompassing a diversity of peoples united around the Russian civilization-forming core” (Bagdasaryan 2026). The continuously invoked term, “cultural code,” is here coupled with both axiological individuation from Western hegemony, and the zealous “understanding” of good and evil. Russia touts itself as playing the role of the “Katechon” (Kytöneva 2025), the defense against the dying light of Godliness. But the popularity of rap in Russia would suggest there are caveats to this purported vision, and these caveats have themselves internal caveats as the censorship of rappers in Russia seems to suggest.
In December, 2018, following months of aggressive local and state-level censorship, Igor Matvienko issued an infamous (mis)characterization, “Rap (rests on) three pillars: sex, drugs and protests. They are the route to a nation’s degradation.” However, Putin issued a proviso, “if it is impossible to stop, then it is necessary to lead and accordingly guide. But how to do this depends on us.” This can be seen as the subsequent motivation behind rap culture’s near-complete reformation in Russia, with ideological titans like FACE, Oksimirion, Noize MC, and Morgenshtern transformed into “foreign agents,” whilst others like Pharaoh, Scriptonite, Instasamka, and others forced to alter their expressive language, and in some cases leave rap entirely. Others like Jacques Anthony, one of Russia’s few Black Russian rappers, became a pro-Putin zealot, whilst Husky found a way to navigate between anti-Putinism, revanchist sympathies, Russki sentimentalism, and decolonial regionalism, by endorsing nothing but also opposing nothing. He effectively demonstrates rap culture’s new life in Russia, having become valourized yet simultaneously part of the civilizational project (Kukulin 2020). Rap in Russia could be considered now part of Russki mir but solely because it has proven a useful tool for civilizational unity, one project at a time.
The form vs. content (non) debate provides a fascinating opportunity for future deliberation on this article’s topic, as while national/culture reduction is a tempting orientation, it’s neither true nor rigorous (Lenton 2025). In Soviet musicologist Boris Asafiev’s words, form was content and content is form, both inseparable as they rely on each other. Most importantly, however, was his foregrounding of phenomenology in his analytical reasoning, in other words experience. As Asafiev summarized his musical theorizing, “I wanted to hear forms, to observe how they take shape in the minds of composers and how they are recreated in the perception of attentive listeners. I felt that musical content is what is heard and what is listened to.” Whilst seemingly removed from this article’s discourse, Asafiev asked a question which could reveal a different side of the topic, “Is it that champagne, beer, and water are all poured into the same vessel, or that the same wine is poured into vessels of different shapes?” (Kryukov 1974).
This is all to say, the actual cultural content considered Russian (Russki) is continuously changing alongside the turbulent formal changes such content is situated within (Rossiiskii). Moreover, the 19th-century public debates concerning what Russian music was and was not, their late-19th and 20th century refutations, and later ideological demystifications by Richard Taruskin and others is further proof that even now, no one is clear what the demonym, Russki, actually implies. Our attempts to define Russki, much less Russki kultura, is one of Russia’s worst wicked problems, as either history really has ended or something else entirely which hasn’t been adequately accounted for.
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John Vandevert is a fourth-year doctoral student at Uppsala University in the department of musicology. His research focuses on 1990s Russian rap culture, and the negotiatory dynamics between expressive strategies and global-local relations. He is particularly focused on examining the question of Russianness in Russian rap, and the mediations of cultural and national identity in the production of a domestically-colored voice within the context of Russian rap culture.
Editorial Credit: Yulia Kiseleva


