Why the Kuomintang’s Engagement with Beijing Undermines Taiwan’s Security
Wayne Tan and Anita Chu
Analyses of the April 7, 2026 “Cheng–Xi meeting” risk falling into a conceptual blind spot: interpreting the encounter between the two party leaders through the lens of seeking peace or stability, while overlooking a crucial reality, namely that the Kuomintang (KMT) is not an actor capable of engaging the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on equal strategic footing. Alas, this oversight carries significant danger, as it may push Taiwan toward greater insecurity rather than safety. Taiwan is a democracy and a resilient small state, but it is by no means a great power. In fact, Taiwan remains highly exposed to risk. Its critical strategic position means that, when facing the CCP regime that has never renounced the use of force, Taiwan must constantly think in terms of danger even in times of apparent calm. Accordingly, the central question is not whether "engagement” can bring peace or stability across the Strait, but rather how a structurally disadvantaged Taiwan can interact with a relatively advantaged authoritarian regime without undermining its own security. Historical experience suggests that for small states operating under unfavorable security conditions, engaging with a great power that denies their very subjecthood often produces counterproductive outcomes, leaving them more, not less, vulnerable (Kaufman, 1992; Labs, 1992; Christensen, 1997; Chasek, 2005).
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The fundamental problem with the "Cheng–Xi meeting” is not simply that it is risky for the leader of Taiwan’s opposition party to meet with the head of the CCP. Rather, even if the KMT were the ruling party in Taiwan, such a meeting would still entail substantial risks. What the "Cheng–Xi meeting” ultimately reveals is a deeper pathological syndrome within Taiwan’s perspective of security: a preference for symbolic reassurance over substantive action, and a tendency to equate cross-Strait "engagement” with peace-keeping or stability-making (Janis, 1972; Jervis, 1976; Stein, 1982). This pathology reflects a mistaken belief that high-level meetings with the CCP leaders contribute more to safeguarding national security than the sustained accumulation of Taiwan’s own capabilities (Chang Liao, 2012).
Structural Asymmetry across the Taiwan Strait
The Taiwan Strait is not merely a geographically defined space fraught with political contention; it is, more fundamentally, an asymmetric strategic environment shaped by three mutually reinforcing gaps.
First, there is a gap in material power. The CCP holds a clear advantage in both military scale and economic capacity, enabling it to steadily compress Taiwan’s strategic room and geopolitical space. Second, there is a hierarchical gap in the structure of interaction. In most instances, Beijing dominates the terms of engagement with Taipei. Nearly every cross-strait issue is framed or manipulated by Beijing as one of a hierarchical relationship between China and Taiwan, in which Beijing assumes the role of the superior actor while Taipei is cast in a subordinate position (Lin, 2022). Third, there is a disparity in narrative power. Although the authorities in Taipei do not exercise actual jurisdiction over mainland China, and the authorities in Beijing likewise do not exercise actual jurisdiction over Taiwan and its surrounding islands, the way these realities are framed in both domestic politics and international relations creates a profound asymmetry (Chen, 2022). Taiwan’s de facto independence is consistently overshadowed, and often constrained, by the controversy surrounding the de jure independence of Taiwan. As a result, a polity that is, in practice, already independent remains unable to ignore the political and legal weight of the “One China” issue. By the same logic, however, why is it that the government of the People’s Republic of China, which is legally constituted as an independent entity, has never been required to offer a detailed explanation for its claim that Taiwan—over which the CCP has exercised no authority since its founding in 1949—is nevertheless part of “China”? Put differently, why is a de facto independent Taiwan expected to justify why it is not yet recognized as a de jure independent state, while the PRC, despite never having de facto governed Taiwan, is not held to the same standard of explanation regarding its de jure claim to the island? If these questions are left unaddressed, or deliberately set aside, any discussion or practice of cross-Strait relations will be logically inconsistent and, more importantly, fundamentally unfair to Taiwan.
In an environment shaped by the intersection of the three structural asymmetries mentioned above, cross-Strait "engagement” resembles what the scholar David Shambaugh has described as Beijing’s deliberate strategy of selective interaction and the transmission of political signals (Shambaugh, 2004/2005). Beneath this approach lies a dense web of CCP’s calculation and tactical maneuvering, rather than any genuine pursuit of peace and stability. For Taiwan, which occupies the weaker position, the asymmetries create a fundamental dilemma; namely, increasing engagement may, paradoxically, exacerbate the very national security risks it seeks to manage. Conversely, reducing engagement often invites accusations of being the primary driver of instability in the Taiwan Strait.
The Root of the Pathology
Why do political elites and leaders within the KMT show a preference for engaging with the CCP? We argue that the answer lies in a misjudgment of “agency”. From the perspective of the parties involved in the April 7 meeting, the primary objective of such “engagement” was for Chair Cheng Li-wun to demonstrate the KMT’s indispensable role in managing cross-Strait relations. Yet whether the KMT truly holds such significance depends on whether its agency is symmetrical with that of the CCP on issues concerning Taiwan. However, the very reason the so-called “Cheng–Xi meeting” holds value for Beijing is precisely because this form of cross-Strait engagement is not one of mutual reciprocity or equality. Rather, it serves to signal to the international society that a leader of Taiwan’s opposition party is willing to engage under conditions set by the CCP. Consequently, what appears at the domestic level in Taiwan to be an expression of KMT agency actually reflects a different reality at the level of cross-Strait interaction: without the CCP as the principal actor, there would be no role for the KMT as the supporting actor.
From Taiwan’s perspective engagement with the Beijing authorities should not be reduced to political theater; it must serve as a form of communication essential to safeguarding national survival and security. A vast body of academic literature has already shown that Taiwan’s security depends critically on three pillars: sending the right signals to Beijing, offering clear assurances to Washington, and continuously strengthening the resilience of its own democratic society (Addison, 2001; Tucker, 2009; Rigger, 2011; Glaser, Weiss & Christensen, 2024). The so-called “Cheng–Xi meeting,” however, effectively casts all three aside, thereby heightening Taiwan’s sense of insecurity. If the chair of KMT were indeed to fly to Shanghai on April 7, it would signal that there are constituencies within Taiwan that the CCP can exploit and divide. It would also likely lead the international society to conclude that, even in the absence of formal government authorization, opposition leaders in Taiwan remain willing to engage with the CCP. The signals conveyed by such a meeting point not to greater cross-strait stability, but rather to deepening internal divisions within Taiwan over how to handle relations with the government of PRC. Moreover, the “Cheng–Xi meeting” undermines the clarity of Taiwan’s strategic positioning. For Washington, visible divisions within Taiwan complicate the management of U.S.–Taiwan–China relations, forcing the United States to retain a significant degree of strategic ambiguity. As long as the United States remains unable to move decisively from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity, it will find it difficult to use its commitments to effectively counter the arguments of those in Taiwan who are skeptical of U.S. reliability. Finally, Taiwan’s democratic system risks turning what should be healthy electoral competition into a force that erodes its own democratic resilience. Politicians driven by electoral incentives, in their pursuit of party nominations or reelection, may be willing to trade away Taiwan’s national security in exchange for greater leverage at the political bargaining table for themselves.
In common discourse, "engagement” is often regarded as a means of reducing risk. Yet for smaller, disadvantaged states, engagement frequently fails to mitigate risk and may even produce the opposite effect by weakening their security. Within any interactive relationship, the relatively weaker actor tends to possess limited agency, while the stronger one is inclined to rely first on low-cost forms of engagement, such as talks or meetings, to induce compliance from the weaker side. Precisely for this reason, Taiwan is unlikely to derive greater security from the “Cheng–Xi meeting.” On the contrary, intense and adversarial political competition at home has already led Taipei to send misleading signals to Beijing, compelling Washington to maintain a certain degree of strategic ambiguity and, in the process, contributing to an erosion of Taiwan’s own democratic resilience.
Conclusion: A Seductive Agenda, a Fateful Capitulation
Set against the volatility of global energy markets in 2026 and the looming shadow of conflict in the Middle East, the upcoming “Cheng–Xi meeting” will almost certainly center on three themes: stability, avoiding war, and the future. At its core, the KMT chair is likely to put forward the idea of designating the Taiwan Strait as a zone free of armed conflict, underscoring that Taiwan should neither become a forward operating post in a U.S.–China confrontation nor be reduced to a geopolitical pawn. At the same time, with an Iran-related conflict intensifying pressures on global energy supply, Cheng will likely convince Xi to preserve the cross-Strait status quo, framing such restraint as consistent with Xi’s immediate strategic priorities, especially the need to sustain economic growth at home. Cheng is also expected to float the concept of a cross-Strait “economic safe haven,” designed to shield Taiwan’s semiconductor industry and other critical sectors from arbitrary trade tariffs and from the spillover effects of conflicts elsewhere. Cheng may even explore limited forms of cross-Strait cooperation in energy and electricity, particularly in light of mounting concerns over potential shortages.
If Xi responds positively to these proposals, even in purely rhetorical terms, the KMT would be well positioned to capitalize politically, using “Cheng-Xi meeting” to claim credit with the Taiwanese public and convert that momentum into electoral gains in 2026. If, however, Xi offers little in return, Cheng could still revert to the “1992 Consensus” as a fallback position, signaling to Xi that the KMT stands ready to “defend” the Republic of China’s constitutional interpretation of “one China” within the Legislative Yuan (the Preamble of the Additional Articles of the Constitution of the ROC), in exchange for a commitment from the People’s Liberation Army to refrain from the use of force against Taiwan. Such a move would aim to demonstrate to the international society that the KMT retains the ability to engage the CCP, while simultaneously dismantling the Democratic Progressive Party’s domestic “resist China, protect Taiwan” narrative.
Few observers are aware that Chair Cheng Li-wun came remarkably close to completing a doctoral degree in international relations at the University of Cambridge, and that during her tenure as a legislator she served on the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee. With such combination of academic training and hands-on experience, she would be well positioned to use the “Cheng–Xi meeting” to pursue a limited but meaningful opening in Taiwan’s international space. More specifically, she may seek to persuade Chair Xi to allow Taiwan some room for participation, in an observer capacity, in international organizations that are not politically sensitive but functionally oriented, such as the World Health Assembly (WHA) or the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Crucially, she could also insist that such participation be carried out by professionals affiliated with the KMT, effectively designating who would represent Taiwan in these international institutions. If this strategy were to succeed, the impact could be immediate. As early as the WHA session in late May this year, it could send shockwaves through Taiwan’s democratic system. Should the Taipei government reject what Beijing frames as a gesture of “goodwill” and decline to send representatives, it would almost certainly face sharp domestic criticism. Yet if it were to follow the pathway laid out through the “Cheng–Xi meeting,” it would, in practical terms, risk being reduced to a passive actor, forfeiting both its autonomy in international participation and its executive authority to appoint its own representatives.
Finally, one should not lose sight of a basic reality: Xi Jinping, a political figure who now concentrates the full weight of the CCP’s power and resources in his own hands, is by no means a leader who places the safety and well-being of the people above his personal interests. In front of the cameras, he will almost certainly extend a high-profile, ceremonially generous welcome to Chair Cheng Li-wun, giving her every appearance of respect and stature. Yet behind the closed door, Xi will just as surely seek to bind Cheng in a golden straitjacket of commitments centered on opposing Taiwan independence and advancing unification. For that reason, even if the “Cheng–Xi meeting” were to produce any so-called outcomes related to peace in the Taiwan Strait, such results would, in essence, amount to little more than a recycling of old formulas rather than any genuine step forward. Put differently, the meeting is unlikely to offer Taiwan a better future; instead, it risks locking the island back into the conceptual kekkai of 1992. The cost of such an outcome could prove exceedingly high. At a time when U.S.–China competition is intensifying, a meeting between the two party chairpersons would likely be interpreted in Washington as a strategic shift within Taiwan itself. It would suggest that Taiwan, as a small state, is not fully committed to standing alongside the United States, and that its domestic opposition party is willing to pursue accommodation with a regime that has long threatened it with the use of force. Under such circumstances, this form of cross-Strait “engagement” would not constitute diplomacy, nor would it meaningfully advance peace or security. Rather, it would amount to a high-stakes political gamble on the part of the KMT, coupled with a fateful act of capitulation.
In sum, it is not difficult to foresee that Chairman Cheng of the KMT will return from the "Cheng–Xi meeting” with what appears to be an enticing package of commitments, a deal filled with promises that look appealing but remain largely out of reach. These pledges are likely to place substantial strain on Taiwan’s democratic resilience, exacerbate social divisions, and, in turn, impose significant governing challenges on the administration. Yet such "commitments" appear deeply ironic when set against the reality of the CCP’s missile deployments, military exercises, cognitive warfare, and gray-zone operations directed at Taiwan. In essence, if Cheng Li-wun, acting in her capacity as an opposition leader, were to secure any form of commitment from the CCP, it would almost certainly come at the cost of diluting Taiwan’s will to defend itself. The more political dividends the KMT is able to extract from the CCP, the more Taiwan’s national security and societal resilience are likely to erode. What is unfolding is not a mutually beneficial rapprochement, but rather a slow constriction: Beijing is using “engagement” as a noose, tightening its grip on Taiwan’s sense of sovereignty. This is not a story of shared gains or peaceful coexistence. It is, instead, a textbook case of a Trojan horse.
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Wayne Tan is a Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Politics, National Chung Hsing University (Taiwan), where he also serves as Director of the Center for Indo-Pacific Strategy and Non-Traditional Security. His research focuses on the impacts of trade on state behavior and its implications for global health governance.
Anita Chu is a doctoral student at the Graduate Institute of International Politics at National Chung Hsing University (Taiwan). Her research specializes in the intersection of artificial intelligence and international political economy. She is the author of China’s Influence in Global Governance: The Case of Artificial Intelligence (Master’s thesis, published in Chinese, 2025). This master’s thesis was awarded Best Master’s Thesis by the College of Law and Politics at NCHU.