In June 2026, Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Panama joined Pax Silica, the US flagship initiative to build an artificial intelligence (AI) ecosystem and secure supply chains with trusted partners. Welcoming them, US Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Jacob Helberg framed the accession in terms of material complementarities on strategic minerals, logistics, infrastructure, and digital services that these “friendly states” provide (U.S. Department of State 2026a). In an opposite direction, on July 16th, Brazil, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela became founding signatories of the China-led World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO), a governance-centred forum (China Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2026). At first, these initiatives do not formally conflict, since Washington seeks supply chain and economic security, while Beijing promotes governance norms and open-source development as a public good for the Global South. Yet, Washington has framed Pax Silica membership as a commitment to exclusivity, signaling that overlapping participation in duplicative initiatives would not be allowed (Martina 2026).
Get E-International Relations delivered to your inbox, free. As you sign up, consider becoming a paid subscriber, or make a donation, to support our work.
Brazilian diplomat Celso Amorim observed that “neither Latin America nor Europe is leading the artificial intelligence race,” and that “what we see today are two poles, the United States and China” (Patrick 2026). Latin American states are, nonetheless, not mere spectators in the global AI race, but stakeholder actors whose positions are clarified by distinct paths for development and visions for international order. This article argues that these positions are clarified by a long-standing regional divide between Americanism, which pursues national interest through alignment with the US, and Autonomism, which pursues it through diversified engagement with alternative great powers (Lima 1994; Hirst 2005; Milani, Pinheiro and Lima 2017;), a role currently occupied by China (Bilhar 2024).
Rival AI Architectures in Latin America
Latin America’s positioning rests on two overlapping structures of patronage that predate AI. Beijing has increasingly treated the region as a strategic priority since 2008. It moved from a commodity trade-based relationship of the early 2000s to a complex economic statecraft and incorporation within Beijing’s strategic outlook for international order. During the last decade, China proliferated strategic partnerships with the region, as well as integrating it within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Community with a Shared Future (CSF), and its Global Initiatives. These cooperations have been particularly successful with states marginalized by Washington, wherein Beijing has emerged as a reliable alternative source for investments and loans (Legler, Turzi, and Tzili-Apango 2020). When confronted with Trump’s new hemispheric strategy to reestablish hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, China released its third White Paper on the region, signaling that Beijing will not withdraw despite Washington’s pressure.
China’s AI engagement is orchestrated in this architecture, exemplified by the BRI’s Digital Silk Road, integrated within the China-CELAC Forum, a forum established in 2015 that allows Beijing to engage with the region integrally. More recently, at the Fourth China-CELAC Ministerial Meeting in Beijing in May 2025, President Xi pledged to expand AI cooperation and advance the China-LAC Science and Technology Partnership (The State Council, 2025a). Concurrently, a parallel China-CELAC Internet Development and Cooperation Forum gathered representatives from 13 Latin American states, featuring cybersecurity and AI development and governance (Qing and Liu 2025). The Third White Paper pledges to “explore advancing high-tech cooperation” in AI and to implement China’s Global AI Governance Initiative and Global AI Governance Action Plan with the region (The State Council 2025b). Besides policy directions, Chinese firms such as Huawei, ZTE, and Zhipu AI have invested in 5G networks, “AI-in-a-box” hardware, and data center joint ventures in Colombia, Brazil, and Chile (Zuppello 2025).
This approach, however, is not distinctive to Latin America. China convened similar forums with Africa, months after the CELAC iteration, while the China-ASEAN Artificial Intelligence Cooperation has already held its fourth edition (Fujian Province 2025; ANN 2026). This is better observed in WAICO composition, as only four of the 29 signatory members are from Latin America. Due to the possibility of representation in governance and facilitated access to open-source models, WAICO is particularly attractive to the Global South (United Nations 2024). Yet, the limited Latin American uptake may also reflect that most regional states enter the AI ecosystem as suppliers of critical minerals rather than autonomous developers.
Against China’s framing of AI as an “international public good” (China Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2025), Washington’s Pax Silica functions as a node within a wider doctrinal reassertion of US hegemony, particularly in the Western Hemisphere. The Trump administration revived the Monroe Doctrine in 2025 through its “Trump Corollary,” committing to reassert US regional primacy and counter narcotrafficking, illegal immigration, rival political regimes such as Cuba and Venezuela, and extra-hemispheric great powers’ presence in the hemisphere through coercive diplomacy and political pressure. Although the AI race in the hemisphere is not mentioned in the 2025 National Security Strategy, the 2026 National Defense Strategy, nor the 2025 AI Action Plan, Pax Silica fully integrates the region as a critical node in the US AI ecosystem. Such integration is orchestrated by ensuring US leadership in the AI race via securing access to critical minerals exports, advanced manufacturing, reduction of regulatory barriers, and technology infrastructure for partner nations, while denying it to competitors (U.S. Department of State 2025). Considering its strategic concepts emphasizing critical minerals, logistics, and infrastructure, Latin America may function as a critical node in US’s supply chain economic security, as observed by Under Secretary Helberg’s emphasis on Costa Rica’s and El Salvador’s nearshoring potential due to geographical proximity, and Argentina’s and Chile’s lithium reserves (U.S. Department of State 2026a).
Yet perhaps the most strategically exposed state in the Western Hemisphere is Panama. After the Trump administration vowed in 2025 to retake control of the Canal, President Mulino withdrew Panama from the BRI in February 2025, and in January 2026 its Supreme Court annulled the legal framework behind Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison’s concessions at Balboa and Cristóbal. Panama has since deepened strategic ties with Washington, joining the Shield of the Americas coalition and hosting PANAMAX 2026, the exercise’s first iteration since 2012 (U.S. Embassy in Panama 2026a).
Against this background, the AI dimension acquires its meaning. The Panama Canal is not only framed as a “key terrain” for US defense (NSS 2025), but also as a vital logistical node for high-value infrastructure and supply chains. At the second Pax Silica Summit in June this year, Helberg announced the new Pax Silica AI Assistance Project, a pilot with Panama’s ports and customs authorities to build an AI-driven credentialing platform expediting the “shipping of semiconductors, AI infrastructure, critical minerals, and related products” (U.S. Embassy in Panama 2026b). The project envisioned “Silicon Highway” as a digital-physical corridor that uses cryptographic cargo verification and AI-assisted risk assessment to grant pre-approved “Fast Lane” processing to trusted shipments. The US State Department seeks to commit up to 50 million dollars and has explicit plans to expand the model to other trusted partners if the pilot succeeds (U.S. Department of State 2026b).
Acquiescence and Autonomy as Strategic Approaches to AI
Latin American states’ positioning within this overlapping AI order reflects a historical divide in the region’s foreign policy tradition, and in its pursuit of development under conditions of structural asymmetry and dependence on great powers. This asymmetry has produced two oscillating approaches: acquiescence to Washington and autonomy from it. These opposing stances now extend to how states engage Pax Silica or WAICO.
The logic of acquiescence pursues US support and public goods provision, a stable, predictable relationship with Washington underwritten by American self-restraint, and protection for the coalition (Russell and Tokatlian 2013). It is operationalized through acceptance of US hegemony and support for its core strategic interests. This logic underpins the Americanist foreign policy, which holds that strategic alignment with the US, grounded in Pan-Americanism doctrine and Western liberal ideological affinities, will be rewarded with a favored place in the US-led regional and international order and access to strategic bargains (Lima 1994; Lake 2009). The logic of autonomy, by contrast, is driven by the imperative of political agency (Milani, Pinheiro and Lima 2017; Russell and Tokatlian 2013). Here, foreign and economic policies are oriented toward reducing structural dependency on the US, which requires diversifying trade and strategic partners, deepening intra-Latin American cooperation, and engagement with institutions of the developing world to advance demands for representation and equality in international affairs. The Autonomist foreign policy is embedded in nationalism, self-determination, and pragmatism (rather than automatic alignments) and, at times, deploys anti-hegemonic/anti-US rhetoric in pursuit of the national interest (Bilhar 2024).
Since the first Pink Tide, when left-wing governments proliferated across South America in the early 2000s, these contrasting approaches have been increasingly conditioned by the ideological orientation of state leadership. Right-wing administrations across the region have tended to emphasize their affinity with US leadership, most visibly in Brazilian Jair Bolsonaro’s and Argentinian Javier Milei’s enthusiastic engagement with the Trump administrations (Wehner 2023). Such governments shared a common vision of international and hemispheric affairs, including pursuit of expanded security-economic engagement with the US (e.g., a Major Non-NATO Ally status), anti-socialist rhetoric directed at the Cuban and Maduro’s Venezuelan regimes, and a preference for US- or West-led frameworks such as the OECD and OAS, often at the expense of intra-Latin American institutions such as UNASUR. Left-wing administrations, conversely, have emphasized engagement with China as the leading alternative great power and principal source of trade and investments, while promoting regionally led frameworks such as CELAC and UNASUR and using forums such as BRICS+ and the G20 to advocate Global South representation. Under this dynamic, acquiescence pursued through Pax Silica and autonomy pursued through WAICO structure the region’s positioning in the AI race.
Brazil and Argentina in the AI Order
Brazil and Argentina illustrate two distinct positions along the acquiescence-autonomy spectrum, ranging strategies from deliberate diversification to explicit alignment. Their approaches to AI order are, accordingly, largely oriented by the political ideology of their respective domestic leadership.
Brazil exemplifies the Autonomist logic most clearly. Since returning to his third term in 2023, President Luiz I. Lula of the left-wing Workers Party has redirected Brazilian foreign policy priorities toward Global South initiatives and cooperation with China, supporting BRICS expansion and Beijing’s Community with a Shared Future. Concurrently, Lula has been at odds with the Trump administration over trade tariffs and Washington’s Western Hemisphere policy, recently affirming that “Brazil does not fit in anyone’s backyard” at the UN General Assembly (2026a). Even so, Lula has pursued AI innovation along paradigmatic lines, with a pattern of diversification including cooperation with the US, rather than disengagement from it, that prioritizes autonomy by avoiding overdependence on “a single company, technology or country” (Eriich 2026).
In August this year, the administration announced an AI infrastructure package of over 400 million dollars for acquiring supercomputers, part of its Brazilian Artificial Intelligence Plan 2024-2028 (PBIA) (Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação 2024; Ayres 2026). The package explicitly splits projects between US, Western, and Chinese firms to develop “our own data center” (Eriich 2026). It includes a partnership with China’s Huawei and iFlytek for a supercomputing infrastructure in Rio de Janeiro, a tender for a supercomputer in Rio Grande do Norte that US-based Nvidia (already cooperating with Brazilian research institutions through the NVIDIA AI Nation program since 2023) is expected to win, and a semiconductor partnership with Spain on the open-source RISC-V architecture (Holanda 2026).
Aligned with Lula’s stance on global governance and Global South representation, Brazil, along with three other left-wing governments in Latin America, signed the WAICO founding agreement in July (Ministério da Gestão e da Inovação 2026). In international forums, Lula has repeatedly called for “intergovernmental governance of AI, in which all governments have a seat at the table” (Cravo 2024). Should the right-wing Flávio Bolsonaro, Lula’s main challenger, win the presidential election in October, Brazil is expected to shift back toward an Americanist stance, similar to that of Flávio’s father, Jair Bolsonaro. Flávio has already signaled to bring Brazil into the US-led Shield of the Americas (Mello 2026), reevaluate Brazil’s participation in BRICS, and, at the 2026 Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Texas, declared that “Brazil is America’s solution to break dependence on China for critical minerals, especially rare earth elements” (Areal 2026), a supply chain of evident value to the Pax Silica.
By contrast, Argentina under the right-wing Javier Milei of La Libertad Avanza has energetically aligned with Washington. A self-described anarcho-capitalist, Milei favors AI deregulation, having announced a proposal to create a legal category of “non-human corporations” run entirely by AI agents (Milei 2026a), while asserting at the UN General Assembly in 2026 a “commitment to not preemptively regulate AI” (UN General Assembly 2026b). Argentina positioned itself firmly within the US and Western camp in the AI race, even as it preserves economic ties with Beijing. Milei has repeatedly stated that AI is “not geopolitically neutral” and that the West must lead its development while “sharing President Trump’s vision” because “we [Argentina] don’t know what China is doing” (UN General Assembly 2026b; Milei 2026b). Furthermore, Argentina has leveraged its geography and resources to position itself as an “AI pole” (Milei 2024). It has secured a bilateral critical mineral framework with Washington, particularly on lithium, and integrated US’s Project Vault, gaining recognition as Washington’s “key partner for the world” (U.S. Mission Argentina 2026).
The Andes-Atlantic Corridor, jointly launched with the US in September 2026, is the latest initiative since Argentina joined Pax Silica (U.S. Department of State 2026c). As the first Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment corridor in the Western Hemisphere, it aims to connect Argentina’s northwest, rich in critical minerals, and the Vaca Muerta energy basin to inland waterway and Atlantic ports through rail, pipeline, port, power, and digital infrastructure. US financing agencies are expected to support it, with the Export-Import Bank (EXIM) and Argentina signing a framework providing up to 7 billion dollars in financing by 2027, while AI data centers feature among the digital infrastructure projects of interest. Washington also states that it will advance corridor transactions “excluding non-market actors and incorporating trusted technology” (U.S. Department of State 2026c), denoting an exclusive approach to Pax Silica similar to Panama’s Pax Silica AI Assistance Project.
Conclusion
Latin America is neither a bystander nor a unified bloc in the China-US AI race. Rather, the region’s position is elucidated by a historical divide between acquiescence and autonomy, wherein AI sits as a new dimension in which regional states have a role. Pax Silica assigns Latin America a partner function within a US-designed supply chain in exchange for security, financing and standing, resembling the architecture of its regional hegemonic order. WAICO, by contrast, offers voice in governance and access to open-source models, which widens partner choice, but its capacity-building provisions remain modest relative to the capacity gap that autonomy requires. Ideology sets the direction between these choices. Under the Autonomist approach, Brasília bargains with both main poles to build domestic capacity and co-production, while the Americanist Buenos Aires trades deregulation and critical resources to position itself as a strategic supplier and prospective node within the US AI ecosystem. The Autonomist–Americanist divide thus explains what states seek and expect from the AI race, rather than what they will obtain. As Washington and Beijing institutionalize rival AI orders, the decisive question for the region is whether alignment buys capacity or only access.
References
ANN. 2026. “Fourth Forum on China-ASEAN Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Successfully Held in Nanning, Drawing Over 700 Delegates.” Asia News Network. September 21. https://asianews.network/fourth-forum-on-china-asean-artificial-intelligence-cooperation-successfully-held-in-nanning-drawing-over-700-delegates/.
Ayres, Marcela. 2026. “Brazil launches AI supercomputer push, splits projects between Chinese, US firms.” Reuters, August 20. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/brazil-launches-ai-supercomputer-push-splits-projects-between-chinese-us-firms-2026-08-20/.
Bilhar, Mateus. 2024. “When Does BRICS Matter? Brazil’s Decision in Advancing BRICS When It (Sometimes) Needs To.” Modern Diplomacy, October 11. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/10/11/when-does-brics-matter-brazils-decision-in-advancing-brics-when-it-sometimes-needs-to/.
China Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2025. “Global AI Governance Action Plan.” July 26. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng./xw/zyxw/202507/t20250729_11679232.html.
China Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2026. “Chair’s Statement of the 2026 World Artificial Intelligence Conference & High-Level Meeting on Global AI Governance.” July 17. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/zyxw/202607/t20260717_11984715.html.
Cravo, Alice. 2024. “No G7, Lula defende governança internacional da inteligência artificial.” O Globo, June 14. https://oglobo.globo.com/economia/noticia/2024/06/14/no-g7-lula-defende-governanca-internacional-da-inteligencia-artificial.ghtml.
Eriich, Felipe. 2026. “Lula defende IA brasileira para sair de disputa entre EUA e China.” Veja, September 25. https://veja.abril.com.br/economia/lula-defende-ia-brasileira-para-sair-de-disputa-entre-eua-e-china/.
Fujian Province. 2025. 2025 “China-Africa Internet Development and Cooperation Forum convenes in Xiamen.” September 29. https://www.fujian.gov.cn/english/news/202509/t20250929_7016985.htm.
Holanda, Armando. 2026. “Governo Lula lança plano brasileiro para inteligência artificial em foco em soberania tecnológica.” Brasil de Fato, August 20. https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2026/08/20/governo-lula-lanca-plano-brasileiro-para-inteligencia-artificial-com-foco-em-soberania-tecnologica/.
Lake, David A. 2009. Hierarchy in International Relations. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Lima, Maria R. S. 1993 “Ejes analíticos y conflicto de paradigmas en la política exterior brasileña.” América Latina Internacional 1 (2): 27-46.
Martina, Michael. 2026. “US to tell partners they must pick sides in AI race with China.” Reuters, August 17. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-tell-partners-they-must-pick-sides-ai-race-with-china-2026-08-14/.
Mello, Patrícia C. 2026. “Veja o que os candidatos à Presidência pensam.” Folha de S. Paulo, September 12. https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2026/09/veja-o-que-os-candidatos-a-presidencia-pensam-sobre-eua-china-brics-e-outros-temas-de-politica-externa.shtml#flavio-bolsonaro.
Milani, Carlos R. S., Leticia Pinheiro, and Maria R. S. de Lima. 2017. “Brazil’s foreign policy and the ‘graduation dilemma’.” International Affairs 93 (3): 585-605. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix078.
Milei, Javier. 2024. “Javier Milei em el 10 Latam Economic Forum.” Casa Rosada, June 5. https://www.casarosada.gob.ar/informacion/discursos/50530-palabras-del-presidente-de-la-nacion-javier-milei-en-el-10-latam-economic-forum-en-salon-golden-mercantil.
Milei, Javier. 2026a. “Javier Milei: Argentina Invites AI to Free Itself.” Financial Times, June 3. https://www.ft.com/content/f93022fe-43f7-437d-abd8-06c457c0a43c.
Milei, Javier. 2026b. “Discurso del President Javier Milei en The Economic Club de Nueva York.” Casa Rosada, September 24. https://www.casarosada.gob.ar/slider-principal/51379-discurso-del-presidente-javier-milei-en-the-economic-club-de-nueva-york.
Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação. 2024. “Plano Brasileiro de Inteligência Artificial.” Gov.br. https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/transformacaodigital/plano-brasileiro-de-inteligencia-artificial?TSPD_101_R0.
Ministério da Gestão e da Inovação. 2026. “Nota à imprensa conjunta MRE, MCTI e MGI sobre a fundação da Organização Mundial para a Cooperação em Inteligência Artificial (WAICO).” Gov.br, July 16. https://www.gov.br/gestao/pt-br/assuntos/editoria-defeso-eleitoral/nota-a-imprensa-conjunta-mre-mcti-e-mgi-sobre-a-fundacao-da-organizacao-mundial-para-cooperacao-em-inteligencia-artificial-waico.
Monica Hirst. 2005. The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations. New York: Routledge.
Areal, Pedro. 2026. “Fala de Flávio Bolsonaro nos EUA sobre terras raras revolta a esquerda.” Metrópoles, March 29. https://www.metropoles.com/brasil/fala-de-flavio-bolsonaro-nos-eua-sobre-terras-raras-revolta-a-esquerda.
Patrick, Igor. 2026. “Latin America and Europe are bystanders in the US-China AI race, says Lula’s top advisor.” South China Morning Post, June 17. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3357353/latin-america-and-europe-are-bystanders-us-china-ai-race-says-lulas-top-adviser.
Qing, Feng and Liu, Boqian. 2025. China-CELAC forum examines mutual benefits of tech sharing. China Daily. May 17. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202505/17/WS6827e278a310a04af22bff37.html.
Russell, Roberto, and Juan G. Tokatlian. 2013. “América Latina y su gran estrategia: entre la aquiescencia y la autonomía.” Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals 104: 157-180.
The State Council. 2025a. “President Xi’s keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC Forum. May 13. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202505/13/content_WS68234033c6d0868f4e8f2811.html.
The State Council of the People’s Republic of China. 2025b. “China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean.” December 10. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202512/10/content_WS693962c3c6d00ca5f9a08069.html.
The White House. 2025. “National Security Strategy of the United States of America.” November. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf.
Thomas Legler, Mariano Turzi and Eduardo Tzili-Apango. 2020. “Advancing Autonomy? Chinese Influence on Regional Governance in Latin America,” in Raul Bernal-Meza and Li Xing Eds., China-Latin America Relations in the 21st Century: Dual Complexities of Opportunities and Challenges, Boston: Palgrave Macmillan: 27-54.
U.S. Department of State. 2025. “Pax Silica.” https://www.state.gov/pax-silica#what.
U.S. Department of State. 2026a. “Under Secretary Helberg’s Remarks on the Joining of Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Panama to the Pax Silica Initiative.” Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, June 2026. https://www.state.gov/releases/under-secretary-for-economic-affairs/2026/06/under-secretary-helbergs-remarks-on-the-accession-of-argentina-chile-costa-rica-el-salvador-and-panama-to-pax-silica.
U.S. Department of State. 2026b. “Pax Silica AI Assistance Project NOFO.” https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/08/pax-silica-ai-assistance-project-nofo.
Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State. 2026c. “United States and Argentina Launch Andes-Atlantic Corridor.” September 23. https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesman/2026/09/united-states-and-argentina-launch-andes-atlantic-corridor-fact-sheet.
U.S. Embassy in Panama. 2026a. “PANAMAX 2026 Concludes.” August 13. https://pa.usembassy.gov/panamax-2026-concludes-back-in-the-field-for-the-first-time-since-2012/.
U.S. Embassy in Panama. 2026b. “Panama joins the Pax Silica Initiative June 29, 2026.” June 29. https://pa.usembassy.gov/panama-joins-the-pax-silica-initiative-june-29-2026-washington-d-c/.
U.S. Mission Argentina. 2026. “U.S. and Argentina launch Strategic Framework to Strengthen Critical Minerals Supply Chains.” U.S. Embassy in Argentina, February 5. https://ar.usembassy.gov/u-s-and-argentina-launch-strategic-framework-to-strengthen-critical-minerals-supply-chains/.
UN General Assembly. 2026a. “Brazil: Transcript & Summary.” United Nations, 81st session, September 22. https://gadebate.un.org/en/81/brazil.
UN General Assembly. 2026b. “Argentina: Transcript & Summary.” United Nations, 81st session, September 23. https://gadebate.un.org/en/81/argentina.
United Nations. 2024. “Governing AI for Humanity: Final Report.” https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/governing_ai_for_humanity_final_report_en.pdf.
Wehner, Leslie E. 2023. “Stereotyped Images and Role Dissonance in the Foreign Policy of Right-Wing Populist Leaders: Jair Bolsonaro and Donald Trump.” Cooperation and Conflict 58 (3): 275-292. https://doi.org/10.1177/00108367221108814.
Zuppello, Maria. 2025. “The AI Red Flag: How Beijing Is Capturing Latin America’s Digital Future.” Diálogo Américas. December 9. https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/the-ai-red-flag-how-beijing-is-capturing-latin-americas-digital-future/.
Mateus Bilhar is Postdoctoral Research Fellow and Shuimu Scholar at the Department of International Relations, School of Social Sciences, Tsinghua University. His main research interests focus on China-Latin America Relations, Brazilian Foreign Policy, Small and Middle State Foreign Policy Behaviour amid Great Power Competition, and Global South Studies. His work has appeared in Politics, International Relations, Journal of Political Science Education, and Journal of Latin American Studies, among others. Additionally, he has contributed to outlets such as The Diplomat, Global Americans, Revista de Relações Exteriores, and Modern Diplomacy, and to edited volumes such as Clash of Exceptionalisms in International Relations (Routledge) and China as a Global Narrator (Palgrave Macmillan).