This is an excerpt from Critical Terrorism Studies: A Dictionary by Lee Jarvis and Alice Martini. Available in all good book stores, and via free download from E-International Relations.
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Definitions of Terrorism
Terrorism is a notoriously challenging term to define, and no shortage of ink has been spilled on this task in academic work, government legislation, international conventions and beyond. There is no universal definition of terrorism, and there is unlikely ever to be one, not least because of the term’s inherently negative connotations and political usefulness as a tool with which to criticise or demonise the actions of others. Because of this, we might think of terrorism as an example of an ‘essentially contested concept’ – one for which there exists no agreement on the criteria for its appropriate usage. Efforts to move toward resolving the definition of terrorism have involved surveys of researchers, the creation of composite definitions taking features from a range of existing understandings, and analytical efforts to identify the core features of this phenomenon. Although some have argued that this definitional quest has become a distraction from more pressing concerns – such as how to counter terrorism in the ‘real world’ – others believe continuing engagement with it remains important. The reasons for this include holding governments to account when they use the term in a nakedly political way; the importance of being careful and accurate in our use of this terminology as students and researchers of terrorism; and the importance of definitional precision within instruments aiming to address this threat such as counterterrorism laws (Jackson et al 2011, 107).
Critical terrorism scholarship has tended to take one of two positions on this topic. The first is to engage critically with the assumptions of prominent definitions of terrorism in order to show their limitations and biases. One important example here involves showing how ‘actor-specific’ definitions – which limit terrorism to the violences of non-state organisations – make it difficult or impossible to take seriously the existence of ‘state terrorism’. Other examples include work highlighting how assumptions about terrorism’s distinctiveness or exceptionality may camouflage similarities with other forms of violence which have similar characteristics (e.g. Dexter 2012; Gentry 2015). A second strategy is to reject the task of defining terrorism altogether. Work here might focus on describing specific acts of violence rather than attempting to define terrorism – thereby avoiding generalisation; looking at how the concept is used and applied in practice, and the consequences that follow particular uses; or simply refusing to use the language of terrorism because of problems inherent to its history, framing, and selective application (e.g. Khan 2024).
Terrorism
The concept of terrorism is a notoriously contested one that has always evaded the search for a universal definition by academic researchers and political elites. The term has its etymological roots in the Latin verb terrere, which means to ‘bring someone to tremble through great fear’ (Schmid 2011, 41). Its use to capture acts of political violence is typically traced to the French Revolution of the late eighteenth century where it was employed to describe the new political regime of Maximilien Robespierre following the monarchy’s downfall. In the two hundred or so years since those events, the concept has become far more familiar to us to describe the actions of non- state organisations such as FARC in Colombia, or the Provisional IRA.
There are multiple reasons for terrorism being such a difficult concept to pin down (Weinberg et al 2004). First, is its inherently negative connotations. By this, we mean that terrorism is widely seen as an immoral or unjustifiable type of violence. It is much more common to hear it applied to the actions of others, than for people to define themselves as ‘terrorist’, although this was not always the case. Second, is the wider issue of subjective biases that reduce our ability to define the world accurately or objectively. An act of violence may look like the ideologically motivated and heinous murder of innocent civilians – and, therefore, without question terrorism – to one observer. Another observer, however, might view the same act of violence as a necessary, and perhaps even legitimate, act of resistance against an unlawful regime. This distinction is famously captured in the well-known idiom ‘one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter’. A third complicating factor is that the meaning of terrorism is one that continues to change over time. These changes can be dramatic – such as the shift from state violence to non-state violence in dominant understandings of terrorism. They can also be incremental, and come about through the gradual accumulation of new words such as eco-terrorism or cyber-terrorism.
Although some researchers argue that we are unlikely ever to solve these problems of definition, and that we might better focus our efforts elsewhere, others suggest there are features of terrorism that distinguish it from alternative types of violence. One of these features is the importance of a political motive – something we see in academic definitions as well as in many legal codes which specify the meaning of terrorism. This is what, for some, separates terrorism from mindless violence or criminal violence for economic motives. Another key feature may be terrorism’s communicative nature. By this we mean that the purpose of terrorist violence is not to be found in its consequences for victims: it is the symbolic meaning that such violence communicates to an audience whether that be the government, potential sympathisers, or other terrorist organisations. This instrumentalisation of victims of violence – the turning of people’s deaths into a means for desired ends – is part of what makes terrorism so morally reprehensible for many onlookers.
Within critical terrorism research, terrorism is more frequently approached as a social construct than a material or objective fact. This means that although acts of violence – bombings, knife attacks, aircraft hijackings, and so forth – take place and are ‘real’, those acts only become terrorism when they are labelled as such. The success of those acts of labelling will depend on the rhetorical skills of the labeller, the environment in which they are communicating, the receptiveness of relevant audiences, and other contextual factors. It is not uncommon for there to be disagreement over the meaning of complex acts such as acts of political violence, with different discourses competing with one another to ‘fix’ their meaning.
This discussion might seem abstract or ‘academic’, but once we think about terrorism as a social construction rather than a pre-given reality – several important things follow. First, we must accept that it is possible to interpret acts of political violence in very different ways. Second, we are able to think more critically about responses to political violence if we recognise that those responses are based on constructed – and therefore contestable – understandings of their causes: to justify the post-9/11 war on terror, for instance, it was necessary first to convince people that 9/11 was itself an act of war. Third, it opens up recognition of the racial, gendered, class-based and other power relations that shape how the label is used, applied, understood, and resisted.
Terrorist
The figure of the terrorist has two related, but distinct, meanings in contemporary usage. The first focuses on actions: the terrorist is an individual who plans or commits acts of terrorism such as hijackings, hostage-takings or bombings. The second meaning focuses on identity: the terrorist is a member of a group designated a terrorist organisation such as the IRA in the UK or FARC in Colombia. This slippage is not a pedantic one, and it matters for two reasons. First, because it encourages us to think about who has the power to identify others as ‘terrorist’ – particularly where those individuals have not committed acts of violence. And, second, because it complicates the moral certainties with which terrorists are identified and discussed. Many of us may find it unproblematic to label someone as ‘terrorist’ after they have deliberately driven a car into pedestrians (although, of course, there may still be disagreement here). We may, though, find it more problematic to identify someone thus for their association with, say, an organisation listed as terrorist by the state or political community from which it is seeking independence. Here we might remember that very few people, today, describe themselves or their actions as ‘terrorist’.
Critical scholarship on the terrorist has pulled attention to the racial and gendered construction of this figure. ‘Terrorists’, in the popular imagination – at least in the post-9/11 period – are frequently gendered male, and often racialised as Muslim, Middle Eastern, or Arabic. These stereotypes are important for several reasons. First, they encourage us to forget or downplay the violences of individuals who do not fit with this figure, and are therefore both simplistic and misleading (Dixit 2016). Second, they encourage us to treat individuals believed to fit these profiles as if they are terrorists, or likely to become such. This can mean that whole groups of people get treated as ‘suspect communities’ (Hillyard 1993). Third, these stereotypes can also encourage us to think of terrorism as a problem of agents, not structures: of individuals and their attributes, rather than the contexts in which they find themselves. Although individual decisions and preferences are, no doubt, important in terrorism, most explanatory work on this form of violence argues that there are likely to be multiple, overlapping, causes for it. Fourth, these stereotypes can draw upon longstanding racist and essentialist assumptions about what Muslim men, for instance, ‘are like’ and what motivates their actions. Although the figure of the terrorist remains primarily associated with Muslim men, the label is – of course – applied to others, too, with similarly problematic outcomes. Women terrorists tend to attract media and public fascination, in part because their actions do not resonate with established assumptions around how women ‘should’ behave.
Further Reading
Bogain, Ariane, and Leonie B. Jackson. 2024. “‘Mamie Djihad’ and ‘the White Widow’: Constructing French and British National Identities in Terrorist Times of Crisis”. Critical Studies on Terrorism 17 (2): 353–75.
Dixit, Priya. 2016. “Interrogating Representations of ‘Militants’ and ‘Terrorists’ in the United States’ Militant Imagery Project and the Counterterrorism Calendar”. Critical Studies on Terrorism 9 (1): 97–119.
Ramsay, Gilbert. 2015. “Why Terrorism Can, but Should Not Be Defined”. Critical Studies on Terrorism 8 (2): 211–28.
Shanahan, Timothy. 2010. “Betraying a Certain Corruption of Mind: How (and How Not) to Define ‘Terrorism’”. Critical Studies on Terrorism 3 (2): 173–90.
Townshend, Charles. 2011. Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Weinberg, Leonard, Ami Pedahzur, and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler. 2004. “The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism”. Terrorism and Political Violence 16(4): 777–794.
Lee Jarvis is a Professor of Security and Society at Adelaide University, and holds honorary professorships at the Loughborough University and the University of East Anglia. He is author or editor of 17 books and over 60 articles on the politics of terrorism and security. He is co-editor of Critical Studies on Terrorism, and his research has been funded by the ESRC, the AHRC, the Australian Research Council and NATO among others.
Alice Martini is a Lecturer of International Relations at the Complutense University of Madrid, Spain, and holds an honorary professorship at the Queen Mary, University of London. She is the author of The UN and Counter- Terrorism: Global Hegemonies, Power, and Identities (Routledge 2021), and co-editor of Encountering Extremism: Theoretical Issues and Local Challenges (Manchester University Press 2020) and Contemporary Reflections on Critical Terrorism Studies (Routledge 2023). Her work has been published in journals including Security Dialogue and Third World Quarterly.